MARINE CORPS

Gazette

APRIL, 1946 30c

THIS MONTH'S COVER

THIS month, Capt Alexander Raymond, USMCR, more familiarly known to most readers as the creator of the comic-strip hero, "Flash Gordon," takes a bow as a GAZETTE cover artist. Capt Raymond has portrayed marines in action, especially those in aviation, during the course of the Pacific war, his vivid style stirring the memories of the comic-strip readers. His cover sketch shows two members of a Marine carrier aircraft service detachment reading and re-reading their precious letters from home, while they await the return of a group of our planes engaged in blasting enemy targets.

THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

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
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
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

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

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

The RCA high-altitude altimeter—used at heights up to 40,000 feet. Section at left transmits the radar signals. The unit at the right, times these waves and gives the pilot his exact altitude in feet.

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THE MARINE CORPS
THE PROFESSIONAL MAGAZINE
FOR UNITED STATES MARINES

Gazette

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In This Month's Gazette

RABAUL, the Japanese Gibraltar-like supply center, was to play an important part in the expansion of the "Co-prosperity sphere." Its seizure by the enemy was due to prime factors in the Japanese plan: the completing of the protective screening around Truk, and a need for a large supply and staging area in the Bismarcks area. Allied airmen had a different idea—they substituted a defensive role for an offensive one for it, disrupted supplies emanating from there, destroyed or forced the evacuation of all its air power and succeeded in completely blockading the island. This article, just recently released from the "Secret" file of the U. S. Bombing Survey, gives a full account of the downfall of Rabaul. *What's Left of Rabaul* appears on page 3.

Intelligence, usually associated in the popular mind with beauteous spies, mysterious men and terse dialogue, is actually of major importance to a military operation. All the information from the battlefield, scouts, patrols and prisoners must be logged, classified, evaluated and interpreted before it becomes intelligence. The methods used by G-2 to perform this work are discussed in *Information into Intelligence* on page 15.

Close air support, though not the primary mission of air power, is an auxiliary weapon that can be employed with good results. During this war there were two methods used by the United States services: the Army method and the Navy. *Air Support Techniques*, on page 23, points out the advantages and defects of these two types of air support.

Capt Edwin Klein gives a summary report on the situation in North China with special emphasis on the role of the Marines now in occupied, and sometimes unoccupied, areas.



What's Left of Rabaul

An Allied Strategic Bombing survey party found by-passed Rabaul's garrison well preserved, though forced underground by continuous bombing.

By Capts G. A. Craig and R. H. Griffin

ONE of the most significant Allied victories in the Southwest Pacific theater was the neutralization of Japan's great base at Rabaul, New Britain—the reduction of its major installations and military potential. It was a victory gained, not by invasion, but by a protracted naval and aerial offensive. Yet the military utilization of Rabaul's resources was as effectively denied to the Japanese as if a successful landing had been made.

The full measure of Allied success and the extent to which it disrupted Japanese strategic plans in the South and Southwest Pacific were long suspected. It was not, however, until BrigGen Lewie G. Merritt led a Marine survey party into Rabaul in November 1945, that a complete evaluation of the success of the Allied campaign could be made. The material gathered by this party, which surveyed physical damage at the Japanese base and interrogated key military and naval personnel there, helps to round out the still incomplete history of the Pacific war.

Rabaul was seized by the Japanese on 23 January 1942 from a vastly outnumbered Australian force. Its seizure was dictated by two paramount considerations. The Japanese, first, felt the need of a major naval and air base south of Truk, which would complete the protective screen surrounding that key point. Secondly, they needed a large supply and staging base in the Bismarcks area, for the possession of such a base would expedite their plan to encircle and dominate the Coral Sea.

The Japanese strategic plan in 1942 seems to have envisaged two main drives. The first of these, and the one to which they attached the most importance, was aimed at New Guinea. The second was intended to be a progressive advance down the chain of Solomon Islands and eventually to the New Hebrides. Successful achievement of these objectives would have enabled the Japanese to dominate all of the northern approaches to the Coral Sea and would seriously have jeopardized the position of Australia and New Zealand.

Whether the Japanese contemplated an eventual assault upon Australia is still a matter of conjecture. According to the testimony of a Japanese civilian interpreter at Rabaul—a man who claimed to have been an employee of the Imperial Foreign Office from 1940 to 1943—the Japanese planned, after the capture of New Guinea and the New Hebrides, to invade New Zealand as a preliminary step to a major investment of Australia. The ranking Japanese officials at Rabaul—General Imamura and Admiral Kusaka—denied knowledge of any such plans, and it would be unwise perhaps to place too much credence in the statements of an ex-Foreign Office clerk. But that the Japanese were proceeding with their New Guinea and Solomons plans is known to be true. In the execution of those plans Rabaul played an important part.

Immediately following the capture of Rabaul by the Japanese 17th Army, elements of that force pressed further southward. On 9 February 1942, landings were made at Gasmata on New Britain Island and at points on the northeastern coast of the Papuan Peninsula, New Guinea. One month later, Lae and Salamaua fell to these forces, an event which marked tne real beginning of the New Guinea campaign. The progress of the 17th Army was now intended to be coordinated with the occupation of western New Guinea by elements of the 2d Area Army which had already invaded the island from the nearby Netherlands East Indies. It was the Japanese hope to complete the occupation of New Guinea by Christmas of 1942.

As army operation in New Guinea got under way successfully, the Japanese naval forces in the Southwest Pacific were accomplishing their assigned missions—namely, the development of Rabaul and the extension of Japanese power into the Solomons area. At Rabaul itself, the Japanese began an ambitious program of construction which transformed that small Australian post into a well equipped rear base.

Rabaul was made the headquarters of the Southeastern Fleet, and its commander in chief was given naval jurisdiction over an area bounded by a line running north through the center of New Guinea to the equator, eastward to Nauru Island and thence southeastward between Fiji and Samoa. Attached to the Southeastern Fleet and based at Rabaul were the naval vessels of the 8th Fleet, a large part of the 11th Air Fleet and the personnel of the 8th Base Force. Within a few months after the capture of Rabaul, it was occupied by a force of some 25,000 men and had an aircraft contingent estimated at about 170 planes.

While building up their defenses at Rabaul, the naval forces there sent pioneer detachments into the Solomons to erect new bases. On 13 March 1942, engineers landed at Buka and began the construction of an air strip. Base construction

Allied planes blasting Rabaul harbor took devastating toll of Jap shipping.

was begun also in the Buin area of Bougainville and, in May, on Guadalcanal.

In retrospect, the striking feature of this Solomons program was the leisurely manner in which it was accomplished. The Japanese seem to have expected little or no Allied opposition in this area during 1942. Consequently they did not wish to divert too many men or too much materiel from Rabaul or New Guinea. They proceeded in the Solomons as if they had time to spare, and that, in the end, was to prove a major miscalculation.

In early 1942, however, the Japanese were looking mainly toward New Guinea. One of the principal reasons for the rapid building of strength at Rabaul had been to support that campaign, and now its resources were called into play. To facilitate the New Guinea operation, the Japanese decided, in April 1942, to launch an amphibious assault against Port Moresby, with Rabaul serving as the staging point.

Late in the month, a large convoy of troop and supply ships, escorted by fleet units, departed Rabaul and headed southward through the Coral Sea, with the intention of rounding the Papuan Peninsula and landing its troops at the Australian base. The convoy never reached its goal. En route, it was intercepted by aircraft of an Allied task force, and in the ensuing engagement, which lasted from 4-8 May, was turned back to Rabaul. The battle of the Coral Sea was by no means a clear cut victory for the Allies, but it discouraged further Japanese seaborne assaults upon Port Moresby.

More important than this, however, was the fact that the battle of the Coral Sea marked the beginning of the disruption of the Japanese strategic plan. For one thing, it perceptibly slowed down Japanese operations in New Guinea, and it was not until September 1942 that the army forces could begin their advance across the Owen Stanley Mountains. Moreover, it seemed to have bred a kind of apathy in Japanese councils in that area.

Although the Japanese proceeded with their development of Rabaul, they made no great attempt to speed up their progress in the Solomons, nor to strengthen their bases there. In August 1942, they were just completing the construction of their strip at Guadalcanal, and they had on the island only 3,000 men, less than 400 of whom were combat troops. It was at this juncture that the Allies took full advantage of the Japanese dawdling, and on 7 August 1942, U. S. Marines landed on Guadalcanal.

This landing presented the Japanese with a perplexing choice—either to abandon Guadalcanal and thus jeopardize their plan to dominate the Coral Sea, or to strengthen their garrison there at the risk of further slowing operations in New Guinea. They chose the latter course. The commanders at Rabaul were ordered to strengthen Guadalcanal at all costs and to divert troops intended for service in New Guinea to Guadalcanal.





Rabaul's shore installations burn in the background as an attacking B-25 heads home.

Thus, almost immediately after the Marine landing, the 28th Army Regiment and the 35th Brigade were landed at Guadalcanal and, in early October, a convoy of six transports carried an additional 6,000 army troops to the Solomons base.

From that time until the end of the year, regular and well-organized shipments of men and materiel were made. During this period at least 11 cruiser trips and 100 destroyer runs were made from Rabaul south, carrying reinforcements to the Guadalcanal garrison. Rabaul, at the same time, made the center of an extensive barge traffic which served the same purpose.

Ship movements from Rabaul were escorted by elements of the 8th Fleet and by aircraft, operating from Lakunai and Vunakanau Fields at Rabaul. In September and October, for example, Henderson Field was attacked daily by groups of from 12 to 15 medium bombers and 30 to 40 fighters. Guadalcanal was bombarded by heavy naval units. With this support, the Japanese, by the end of 1942, had been able to land some 30,000 troops on Guadalcanal. This was accomplished, however, against increasing Allied opposition. In October 1942, the Japanese had, because of intensive Allied air attacks, been forced to abandon their submarine supply route through New Georgia Sound. In the following month, they received a graver blow when Allied planes caught a convoy of 11 transports off Guadalcanal, sank seven, and destroyed all but ten per cent of the supplies carried.

After this loss, the Japanese were forced to abandon any attempt to reinforce their Guadalcanal garrison by transport, and to rely increasingly upon destroyers, barges and seatrucks operating from the Shortlands. Even this traffic was hazardous. In the last months of 1942, the Japanese lost at least seven destroyers and numerous smaller craft, and the Guadalcanal garrison began to feel the serious shortage of supplies and reinforcements.

Meanwhile, ground operations on Guadalcanal had been unsatisfactory for the Japanese. Their drive across the Matanikau in October 1942, failed miserably and it was apparent that, unless serious measures were adopted, the island was irretrievably lost.

To forestall such a contingency, Imperial Headquarters, in November, ordered the transfer to Rabaul of the 8th Area Army to assume responsibility for all army operations in the New Guinea-Bismarck-Solomons area. Its commander, General Imamura, was ordered further to retake Guadalcanal and, in order to accomplish this, was authorized to reinforce the garrison there by two full divisions, aggregating 30,000 troops. This program got under way in the first week of December, when Imamura arrived at Rabaul. His troops, numbering some 50,000, had reached that base before the end of the month. Definite plans were made to begin the reinforcement of Guadalcanal on 1 February 1943.

But here again, Japanese plans were frustrated by an unexpected Allied move. While the 8th Area Army was forming at Rabaul, the campaign in New Guinea had bogged down completely. By

mid-December 1942, the troops which had crossed the Owen Stanley Mountains with the hope of taking Port Moresby had been stopped and forced to retreat. Now in the last days of the month, Allied troops accomplished the feat which the Japanese had considered impossible. Crossing the mountains from the south, they overran the Japanese coastal areas and, in the first week of January, captured Buna and Gona.

The Allied successes which had turned back the Japanese offensives both in New Guinea and the Solomons seemed to convince authorities in Tokyo that even the added support of the 8th Area Army would not permit them to regain the initiative and to maintain two simultaneous drives. Therefore, even before the fall of Buna, Imperial Headquarters directed the commanders of the 8th Area Army and the Southeastern Fleet at Rabaul to abandon the plan to reinforce Guadalcanal. The alternative was to evacuate the troops that remained there and to establish defensive positions in the Munda-Kolombangara area. The commanders were further directed to stop the Allied advance in New Guinea and to retake the lost ground.

Thus, at the beginning of 1943, Rabaul was again the center of two extensive and complicated operations—the evacuation of the Guadalcanal garrison and the reinforcement of the troops in New Guinea. In the first of these, the administration at Rabaul was, on the whole, successful. Beginning on 1 February 1943, Japanese troops were transferred from Guadalcanal to Buin by a force of eight personnel transport destroyers and four escort destroyers which made three round trips. By 8 February, 10,000 army troops and 60 per cent of the naval forces had been removed, and the Guadalcanal campaign, as far as the Japanese were concerned, was over.

In their attempts to reinforce New Guinea, however, the commanders at Rabaul had no success. The large convoy, formed at Rabaul, departed for New Guinea in March 1943 and was practically annihilated by Allied aircraft in Vitiaz Strait. With this engagement, the last Japanese hopes to save New Guinea were frustrated.

Throughout 1942 and in the early months of 1943, Rabaul had been the focal point in the extensive Japanese operations designed to control the Coral Sea. From this point on, however, the role of the New Britain base changed. Once the Japanese lost the initiative in the South and Southwest Pacific, they found themselves impotent to regain it, and, as Japanese forces went on the defensive, Rabaul became a defensive base.

Following the battle of the Bismarck Sea, Allied successes came at increasingly frequent intervals and struck ever closer to Rabaul. In July 1943, landings were made on New Georgia. With the capture of the airstrip at Munda Point on 5 August, the Japanese were forced once again to undertake a costly evacuation. While this withdrawal was in progress, new Allied landings were made at Vella Lavella.

In the following month, Lae and Salamaua fell to Allied troops in New Guinea and these same forces pushed on to reach Finschhafen on 20 October; Torokina fell to the U. S. Marines on 1 November; the landings at Arawe and Cape Gloucester followed on 15 and 26 December; and in February of the new year, Green Island was captured and the Admiralty Islands invaded. Careful timing and a shrewd application of force to points of weakness had completely disorganized Japanese lines in the South and Southwest Pacific.

As for Rabaul, by late 1943, it was almost completely surrounded by Allied forces. The base which had been designed as a rear staging and supply base found itself in the front lines of the mounting Allied offensive. It was still, however, a center of great strength. A brief description of its facilities indicates clearly why the Allies found it imperative to turn their full force against it.

Before November 1943, Rabaul had been the target for no really intensive Allied aerial operations. In consequence, its naval, aviation and material resources had remained largely intact. Its air strength alone was formidable. Five fields had been built in and near Rabaul, stocked with a complement of some 600 aircraft, including 400 fighters.

The extensive anchorage in Simpson Harbor had facilities capable of servicing 300,000 tons of shipping. In this harbor, in late 1943, there were at times as many as ten cruisers, 20 destroyers, ten submarines and 200 miscellaneous small craft of the Southeastern Fleet. In addition to these, the Southeastern Army Forces had approximately 180 large transport and cargo ships, 40 small cargo vessels and 500 small boats and barges.

These transport facilities were important, in view of the fact that Rabaul, in November 1943, had a garrison of approximately 90,000 troops which could conceivably be transported for use in other areas, a move scarcely to be welcomed by the Allies. Moreover, since Rabaul had been the main supply center in the Southwest Pacific, it had stocks of food and materiel which, if carried to outlying Japanese garrisons, could strengthen their ability and will to resist the Allied advance.

If only because of the extent of its aviation and transport facilities, it was important that Rabaul be the target for an intensive Allied attack. An actual invasion of the New Britain base was scarcely to be contemplated, because of the size of the Rabaul garrison and the difficulties presented by the terrain. The Allies apparently reasoned that the neutralization of Rabaul could be secured by joint naval and aerial operations, and this was the course eventually adopted.

However, Rabaul presented a difficult target even for aviation. The terrain was favorable to the defenders; the facilities of the base were carefully



White phosphorous streamers form a flaming umbrella over immobilized Lakunai field.

dispersed; it was equipped with an efficient air warning system; and its defenses were strong. With regard to anti-aircraft defenses, for instance, the Rabaul garrison had at its disposal 118 heavy weapons, 249 medium anti-aircraft guns and at least 1,762 machine guns. These guns were carefully disposed so as to protect air facilities, harbor installations and supply dumps.

The gun crews were aided, moreover, by an air warning system of some 11 radar stations strategically located at points in the Solomons-Bismarck area and linked by extensive radio facilities. For practically all routes of approach to Rabaul, the garrison was provided early warning of from 30 to 60 minutes. Thus, Allied aircraft approaching from Torokina were picked up by the radar at Buka, and warning was radioed to Rabaul at least 60 minutes before the strike began.

The excellence of this defensive system had seriously minimized the effectiveness of Allied aerial strikes against Rabaul in the early part of 1943. But, by the end of the year, the Allies had gained an advantage which was to prove decisive. Until November 1943, the only land-based aircraft capable of reaching the New Britain base had been heavy bombers, flying at high altitude and dropping a relatively small tonnage of bombs. With the capture of the Torokina area of Bougainville, the Allies were in possession for the first time of air facilities close enough to Rabaul to use fighters, dive bombers and torpedo bombers. It was possible then to launch an intensified aerial offensive against Rabaul with the primary intention of neutralizing the base and reducing its resources.

The opening of the intensified aerial offensive against Rabaul coincided with the Allied amphibious operation against Bougainville. It was designed to support that operation, making it impossible for the Japanese to throw their Rabaul-based air and naval strength against the Allied task units. But once under way, the offensive against Rabaul was accelerated, and showed no signs of slackening until mid-1944, at which time the major Allied objectives with regard to Rabaul had been attained.

The intensified aerial campaign began in October and November 1943, when aircraft of the 5th Army Air Force dropped a total of 923 tons of bombs on targets in the Rabaul area. Carrier planes of Task Force 38 and Task Group 50.3 at the same time raided Simpson Harbor on 5 and 11 November directing 40 tons of bombs and 79 torpedoes against Japanese shipping. In December, planes of the 13th Army Air Force took over the bombing load and dropped 252 tons of bombs.

Land-based fighters of the Marine Corps entered the campaign for the first time and swept the air facilities of the base. In January, Marine bombers operating from Torokina and the Treasuries and British Empire units based on Bougainville came into the flight and the bombing reached its peak. From January until July, a monthly average of 1,840 tons of bombs was dropped in the Rabaul area.

From August 1944 until the end of the war, a steady campaign of attrition was maintained

(*Continued on page* 39)

Is The Black Dragon Dead?

Treachery and assassinations were the order of the day as the delicately-named secret societies and the military strove to dominate power in Japan.

By Otto Tolischus

(This is the second of two installments.)

FOLLOWING the first World War, Japan, like the rest of the world, was swept by a wave of democratic sentiment, which greatly reduced the influence of the Black Dragon and other secret societies. However, the Black Dragon's concepts did not die, but rather gained an even firmer hold on the extreme Japanese nationalists, who saw in this wave their mortal enemy. These extremist elements tended to center around the younger military officers who formed a society of their own that eventually outstripped the Black Dragon in power and affected both Japan's domestic and foreign policies. But the Black Dragon and Toyama remained in the background as wire-pullers, patrons, and inspirers of all the mischief that was perpetrated in Asia up to and including World War II.

Their thugs shot Premier Hamaguchi in 1930 because he rammed the London Naval Pact, limiting armaments, down the throats of the nationalists. They helped to foment the so-called "Manchurian Incident" of 1931, which resulted in Japan's conquest of a puppet-empire and an arsenal for further conquests, and was later hailed by the Japanese nationalists as the beginning of World War II. They stabbed the one Japanese statesman who had worked to avert this "incident"—by attaining his country's expansionist objectives through peaceful means—Foreign Minister, now Premier, Shidehara.

What Has Gone Before

In the preceding article on the Black Dragon Society, Mr. Tolischus traced the development of the secret, super-patriotic organization which has so greatly influenced Japanese foreign policy. Stemming out of feudal Samurai traditions, first came the Black Ocean Society under the insidious leadership of Mitsuru Toyama. For over 50 years — until his death at the age of 90 in 1944—Toyama was the unofficial emperor of Japan. He forced the war with China in 1894 and the Russo-Japanese war in 1904 and supported Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the Chinese Revolution. In 1901 the Black Dragon Society developed as the select inner circle of the Black Ocean organization. Never numbering more than 20,000 members, the Black Dragon included the most influential men in Japan—admirals, generals, statesmen, and intellectuals.

STILL the results of these individual assassinations were too disappointing for the hotheads, who decided to launch a campaign of terror and assassination on a wholesale scale. But for this purpose other, more ephemeral organizations were sent to the front. On 9 February 1932, terrorists of the Blood Brotherhood, led by a Shinto priest named Nissho Inouye, shot down Finance Minister Inouye, and a month later they did in Baron Takuma Dan, head of the famed Mitsui combine, for opposing the military extremists. And though the police had a good idea as to who was behind the murders, it dared not molest Toyama, not even though it knew that Toyama was harboring the crief assassin in his house.

Later that year, when terrorism had shaken the whole country, the gendarmes did raid Toyama's house, where they seized numerous documents, as well as Toyama's son. The son was found to be a member of two societies—the "Heavenly Conduct Association," at whose school he was ostensibly studying fencing and other "manly arts," and of the "Independent Youth League," whose headquarters, when raided, proved to hold weapons ear-marked for the assassination of other notables, including Premier Saito. Regardless of such evidence, Toyama nevertheless continued to shelter assassins—until he told them to give themselves up.

The Blood Brotherhood, however, was not only a tool of Toyama, but also the civilian wing of the Young Officers, who armed and, in part, financed it. It did not live up to its promise. For a while it's program called for the liquidation of at least 20 prominent men, but it succeeded only in disposing of two. After that, the Imperial Young Officers League took matters in its own hands.

THE aspirations of the League were more grandiose. It proclaimed the Showa Restoration, calling for a "restoration" of all Big Business to Emperor Hirohito, (who named his reign Showa, or "radiant peace") in the same way in which the last century the feudal lords "restored" their feudal fiefs to Emperor Meiji in the Meiji Restoration. For that purpose, which involved a diskuised nationalization of Japanese economy, its leaders, acting in cooperation with civilian thugs from "patriotic" societies, plotted to seize Tokyo, kill the govern-

ment, and blow up parliament while it was in session, to crush all opposition at one fell swoop. Finally, they contemplated the murder of Charlie Chaplin, then visiting Japan, whom they regarded as "a darling of the capitalist class," hoping that his murder would provoke war with the "capitalistic" United States and put them completely in the saddle.

They did not succeed in this particular objective or in blowing up the parliament. But they did have their murder. Fortified with bombs and guns, nine Army and Navy officers and cadets of the League first worshipped at Yasakuni Shrine for war dead, then proceeded to the official residence of Premier Inukai. There they found the Premier ensconced in his private sitting room. "Wait a minute," Inukai pleaded. "Let's talk things over. I'm sure you'll understand my ideas." The officers did not even pause to answer before shooting Inukai dead.

This done, they and their civilian accomplices proceeded to attack the Bank of Japan, throw bombs into various public buildings and attempt to seize Tokyo's power stations in order to throw the city into darkness. The plot was quickly crushed, but it left such anxiety in official quarters that the War Minister begged the murdered Premier's party to keep quiet, lest any agitation provoke the military to further violence. And though the officers involved were put on trial, they posed so successfully as misunderstood heroes that they not only escaped the firing squad, but even got off with comparatively easy prison sentences which were never served in full. Indeed, upon their release, they were tendered a rousing welcome from the patriotic societies, which served as inspiration for more violence.

This violence came soon. In 1935, one of the younger officers killed with his sword Major General Nagata, chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, for trying to disperse the assassin's clique. Though the assassin revealed his intention to another general at the same headquarters, the latter merely pleaded with him to desist, but did nothing to interfere with the murder itself, and even sent a messenger to find out whether the intended victim was actually in his office. And when the assassin was seized, he readily admitted that he was ashamed—not because he had killed, but because "in executing Heaven's judgment," he had failed to kill his victim with one stroke, as a true Samurai should. He was tried, but again the court became merely a forum for the accused to preach revolution in the name of patriotism. He attacked the Emperor's advisers, the financial cliques, the military cliques, the superior officers, and even threatened the court. As a result, he, like his predecessors, became a popular hero, and the court was deluged with petitions for his release, many of them written in blood. In fact, this trial aroused so much popular excitement that it became the spark which ignited the greatest internal disturbance in Japan preceding the war — the Army Mutiny of February 1936.

This outbreak was staged by troops stationed in the barracks where the trial of Nagata's killer was being held. Led by lieutenants and captains commanding some 1,400 troops, the mutineers occupied the center of Tokyo, and armed with swords and sub-machine guns, embarked on a new attempt to exterminate the government. They assassinated the Lord Keeper of Imperial Seals, Admiral Saito, and wounded his wife. They killed the Finance Minister, Takahashi, the Inspector General of Military Education, Lieutenant General Watanabe, and seriously wounded the Grand Chamberlin, Admiral Suzuki. They would have killed the Premier, Admiral Okada, if he had not hid in a bathroom. But they did find Okada's brother-in-law and, mistaking him for the Premier, killed him. Two days later, Premier Okada walked out of his residence under the noses of the mutineers by posing as a mourner attending what was ostensibly his own funeral. Count Makino, the former Lord Keeper of Seals and one of the Emperor's chief advisers, escaped by a back door of his country residence when a courageous policeman held off the assassins at the price of his own life.

The mutineers occupied the center of Tokyo for four days. They harangued the crowds, issued manifestos, blaming everything, including their own rebellion, on the elder statesmen, financial magnates, government officials and political parties, and demanded that the Emperor should rule and that the power and prestige of Japan must be enhanced forthwith. Finally, the mutiny was quelled when the High Command took the unprecedented step of appealing to the soldiers over the heads of their officers and invoked the name of the Emperor for that purpose. Under the Japanese code, all officers

should have committed hara-kiri, but only one did. The rest, hoping for another show-trial, which would give them a chance to pose as heroes and to spread their doctrine, decided against it. But the long series of assassinations, climaxing in the mutiny, had finally aroused both the Government and the people to the menace of a soldiery running amok. The 15 officers involved, as well as Nagata's assassin, were now tried by secret court martial and shot.

Probably the most fantastic of the secret society plots, however, was that of the God-sent Troops, which involved Army and Navy officers, business corporations and financiers, and combined blackmail and shady stock operations with murder. The chief figure in it was a Commander Yamaguchi, brother of the priest Nissho Inouye, who had been adopted in another family. Yamaguchi was assigned to exterminate the Government by bombing the Premier's residence from the air while the Cabinet was in session there. This, in turn, was to be the signal for others of the God-sent Troops to assault other leaders, burn down the offices of political parties, and continue along that course until martial law was proclaimed and the Army took over the "revolution."

The plot, however, was discovered, and the participants arrested. Yamaguchi died in prison, but 62 others were put on trial. However, though the plot had been hatched in 1933, their trial did not begin till November 1937, and dragged on until 1940, by which time the number of defendants had been reduced to 17. These continued to pose as heroes fighting against "western materialism" and for the establishment of direct rule by the Emperor. They even walked out of court in protest against the prosecutor's views regarding the Emperor's position. They were sentenced, but only to short prison terms. And four of the prisoners were released by a superior court in March, 1941, on the curious ground that even though they had plotted insurrection and the killing of members of the Cabinet, nevertheless, they did not really intend to do away with cabinet government, and therefore should be dismissed.

THE presiding judge openly expressed sympathy for them, and cited the change in the country's internal and external conditions as reason for exempting them from punishment. "If the accused had been punished," the judge proclaimed, "a blot would have been cast on the history of the nation."

But, as the judge suggested, by that time war in the Pacific was in the making, and the scent of new war brought the aged Toyama back to the center of the stage. In 1940 he came forward as sponsor of the "Federation for Campaigning Against Christian Organizations," which he accused of being "a device of Jewish ideas" to undermine the Japanese spirit. In March, 1941, he became a sponsor of the "Nationalist League," whose proclaimed purpose was to "unite the hearts of the people in the most serious crisis ever experienced in the history of Japan."

A month later, he issued the Japanese battle-cry for the war: "The red-haired barbarians must be expelled from East Asia." In June he became one of the main figures behind a new "Council for Launching National Policy," which sent a "letter of advice" to the government of Prince Konoye, signed by Toyama and other radicals, demanding an immediate march into French Indo-China. And when international excitement ran high over the Japanese bombing of the American gun-boat "Tutuila," regarded as a deliberate Nipponese provocation, Toyama lunched with Premier Konoye for the same sort of purpose that had led him to call on Prince Ito years before. Once again, it was war or assassination. And since Konoye hesitated, a fresh wave of assassinations was in the wind.

The first victim was Baron Hiranuma, the Home Minister, who was shot and seriously wounded by another Shinto priest named Nishiyama, just 14 days after Toyama's luncheon with Konoye. Two weeks later an attempt was made on Konoye's own life by four armed men who sprang on the running-board of the Premier's car. Only the fact that the doors of the car were locked, coupled with the driver's presence of mind in putting on a burst of speed which knocked the would-be assassins from their perch, saved him. But shortly after this, Konoye resigned, and General Togo, once a member of the Younger Officers, took over. The Japanese war machine began to move toward Pearl Harbor, bent on conquest of the world.

But this time the calculations of the "patriots" did not work out so well. And now General MacArthur is disbanding their secret societies and arresting their leaders, including even Princes of the Imperial family. He is looking into their past crimes in an effort to correct the partiality of Japanese justice, and he is meting out justice to the war criminals. He is changing the whole political, economic, and religious structure of the Japanese State, and is thereby modifying the whole pattern of Japanese life, of which the secret societies were an integral part.

BUT the Japanese are masters at disguise, and as the recent past shows, the more they change, the more they remain the same. The secret societies remain at work underground, to carry out Japan's "divine mission" to "unite" the world under their Emperor.

To the Japanese, with their vaunted perspective of 3,000 years of history, however phony, the present defeat is merely an incident, a temporary setback to be reversed at the first opportunity. When Japan attacked America and Great Britain, she proclaimed a Hundred Years' "Holy War," to be carried on from generation to generation till, finally, victory is achieved.

And that proclamation still stands. END

Marine guards keep open North China's few remaining operational miles of railroad.

Situation in North China

Marines guard railroads, disarm and repatriate Japanese nationals, find themselves in the middle of an incipient civil war between Nationalists and Communists. ***By Capt Edwin Klein***

THE fact that the Marines are in North China to assist the Chinese Nationalist Government in the disarming and repatriation of the Japanese forces and not to take sides in a civil war has been repeated often and emphatically, but political sharpshooters persist in seeing a situation paralleling the Spanish Civil War. This analogy is false but their further contention that, no matter what form the aid may take, any assistance rendered the Nationalist forces proportionately weakens the Communists, is indisputably true.

The official American counter to this has been that, while the internal politics of China are not our affair, the complete and absolute dismantling of the Japanese military and political machine in North China as elsewhere is without question our business and until this is done the Marines will stay.

The Communist demands as presented by Mao Tse-tung to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek were basically that they had been fighting a guerrilla war with Japan independently of the Chungking effort and that they rated a certain amount of the glory and more to the point, a definite share of the spoils.

The Communists also introduced the fear that occupation of the strategic and commercially important treaty ports by Allied forces would result in the re-establishment of foreign concessions.

At the time of the Nipponese collapse, the Communists were ready, willing, and eager to accept the Japanese surrenders in three strategic areas. In the north, center of the strongest Communist influence, the Eighth Route Army confidently expected to control the area now occupied by the Marine expeditionary force. In the Shanghai sector, the Communist New Fourth Army, which had encircled

Editor's Note: This story was written before the Chinese Nationalist and Communist troops declared their truce for Chinese unity. Concentrated attacks on each other have been suspended but sporadic outbursts continue.

the city, stood unhappily by while Chiang's 94th Army was flown in by the U. S. Tenth Air Force. And further south, the South China Anti-Japanese Resistance Army was maneuvered out of Canton by the Nationalist New First Army.

In Hopeh and Shantung Provinces, marines of the Third Amphibious Corps are present in, if not technically in occupation of, the four key cities of Tientsin, Peiping, Tsingtao, and Chinwangtao.

The Marine landings began on 30 September when elements of the First Marine Division funneled through Taku-Tangku and arrived at Tientsin, North China's chief commercial city. The formal surrender of the Japanese garrison forces in Tientsin occurred on 6 October when MajGen Keller E. Rockey, commanding general of the Marine expeditionary troops, received the sword and surrender of LtGen Ginnosuke Uchida, who commanded the 50,588 Japanese in the Tientsin area.

The Nip garrison consisted of the 118th Infantry Division, the North China Special Guard, and the Ninth Independent Mixed Brigade. Jap divisions in North China were the brigaded type, similar in organization to the pre-war U. S. Army "square" division. The Independent Mixed Brigades, of which there were many in China, correspond somewhat to Marine regimental combat teams in size and purpose.

Immediately after the initial landing, the reinforced Fifth Regiment under BrigGen Louis R. Jones, pushed through to Peiping while to the south, Tsingtao, former hub of German influence in China, was occupied by the 22nd and 29th Regiments of the 6thMarDiv. On 25 October, at Tsingtao's race course, Division Commander MajGen Lemuel C. Shepherd received the surrender of the Fifth Independent Mixed Brigade plus attached units.

Significant: the entire Jap garrison force in North China was substantially without air cover and possessed very little artillery.

Chinwangtao, 123 air miles north of Tientsin, is China's chief coaling port. It is also only 14 miles from Shanhaikwan, where the Great China Wall meets the sea and the eastern anchor of the Manchurian-North China border. The First Battalion, Seventh Marines, under LtCol James M. Masters, went ashore at Chinwangtao on 4 October.

The city was occupied by Japanese and puppet troops, who were surrounded by Communist forces. A Communists' delegate sent to meet the Marines was recognized and shot by the puppets. This provoked an attack by the Communists and the resulting skirmish between the Reds and city's garrison with the Marines as interested spectators continued for two days, ceasing when Col Masters directed the Jap and puppet troops to withdraw southward to Tangshan.

In Tsingtao prior to the Marines' arrival, Chinese marauders, some of them in uniform, were openly looting German and Japanese property. In Tientsin shortly after the surrender, bands of Chinese rioted in the former Japanese concession, mauling Japanese nationals on sight. Also in Tientsin, the Korean Restoration Army, an underground move-



A Japanese machine gunner relinquishes his weapon to a Marine ordnance officer.

ment, struggled with the Korean Residents Association for control of that city's 15,000 Koreans.

These local disorders subsided when motorized marines began patrolling the streets and Marine sentries began guarding the water works, power plants, and other important utilities.

Less easily solved was the matter of communication and transportation between the four major Marine-held areas.

Most of China's 9,000 miles of railroad are in North China and most of these miles are now inoperative.

Moving supplies and personnel from the port of entry, Taku-Tangku, to Tientsin is easy: there are three available routes over the 30-odd miles—the railroad, the Hai Ho River navigable to anything up to the size of an LSM, and the rough but serviceable 30-foot-wide highway.

From Tientsin on, things become progressively more difficult. Rail service from Tientsin to Peiping is safe and fairly certain. Marine guards ride the trains and only once in a while a few shots are fired. The 78-mile trip averages four hours. There is also a single-laned concrete and macadam highway, often cut by roadblocks, but passable to motor convoys.

From Tientsin to Chinwangtao is 160 miles. Chinwangtao is the shipping point for the coal produced by the Kailan Mining Administration, coal that is desperately needed in the Peiping-Tientsin area. From Tientsin to Tangshan, the half-way point, the railroad is fairly good and reasonably safe. From Tangshan to Chinwangtao are 80 miles of blown bridges, loosened and mined rails, and rifle attacks. Once the road was double-tracked, now it switches from track to track to avoid twisted and rusting wreckage, the result of eight years' guerrilla warfare. Even if no resistance is met, the 80 torturous miles takes eight hours.

Reasonable assumption: if Marine guards did not ride the trains, no coal would reach Tientsin by that route.

When the line is completely inoperative or a backlog of traffic has built up, marines in the Chinwangtao area are supplied by LSTs and LSMs crossing the Gulf of Chihli from Taku.

A 500-mile railroad links Tientsin and Tsingtao, running about 20 miles due south to Tsinan and then eastward along the length of the Shantung Peninsula to Tsingtao. But this rail connection is strictly theoretical; the length of the line makes it impractical to guard and much of it has been destroyed by Communists and bandits. All military traffic between the 6thMarDiv and the rest of the Third 'Phib Corps is by air or water.

For while the Nationalists control the four vital city areas mentioned, the surrounding countryside is dominated by Communists. The old-time warlord-converted-to-Communist MajGen Yu Te-shui claims control of all of Shantung Peninsula, including the coastline from Tsingtao to Taku.

The two most important cities held by the Communits are the Yellow Sea port of Chefoo and Kalgan, the Great Wall stronghold north of Peiping and second key to Manchuria.

The Communists in the Shantung-Hopeh Provinces are regular troops belonging to numbered regiments which are grouped in accordance with accepted military usage into divisions, corps, and armies. These regiments are small, from 500 to 1,000 men, and their uniforms, equipment, and arms vary from adequate to none at all. There is no established pay scale. Their purpose is not limited to military use, for they also attempt to organize the territory they occupy from the ground up, economically, politically, and socially.

Now that they have been maneuvered out of the commercially and strategically important areas in Hopeh and Shantung, the Communists plan a delaying action while they consolidate their positions to the west and in Manchuria. Their current program is to hamstring Nationalist movements by disrupting communications and to take by force what loot is available from the Japanese.

So thoroughly have the railroads, the only practicable means of land transport in North China, been cut that only relatively short lines from Tientsin to Peiping and Chinwangtao remain open.

The Peiping-Hankow and the Tientsin-Pukow lines, the two railroads connecting North China with the south and the Peiping-Mukden link with Manchuria have been virtually eliminated in a manner which would cause the old railroad buster, Gen Billy Sherman himself, to nod approvingly.

On the Tientsin-Pukow line alone, the Chinese communications minister, Gen Yu Fei-peng, reported 108 sections of track, 30 bridges, and 25 telegraph installations destroyed. To the west along the parallel Peiping-Hankow line, nearly 200 miles of track have been knocked out, some of the rails being moved inland as metal for Yenan's crude arsenals.

The Reds have carefully avoided any direct attack on Marine-held positions, but there have been repeated instances of firing on Marine-guarded trains and motor convoys.

Early in October, the U. S. Tenth Air Force began shuttling the American-trained, American-equipped 92nd and 95th Chinese National Armies into Peiping and Tientsin.

These troops in their padded cotton uniforms, some mustard yellow and some slate blue, were there nominally to take over from the Marines the task of disarming and repatriating the Japs. But it was soon obvious that their primary goal was to secure their position against the Communists and that the evacuation of the Japanese military was strictly a secondary objective.

Paradoxically, it has even been to the Nationalist advantage to delay the disarming of the Japanese forces. The reason: the Nips are the Nationalists' most available military reserve in an area where the Nationalists are still numerically inferior to the Communists. The Japs have shown no hesitation about continuing their old fight against the Communists. Much of the railroad and many of the tactically important areas under Nationalist control are Jap guarded.

The Communists, enviously eyeing this reservoir of trained fighting men, have attempted to recruit a Japanese "Liberation" Army which one day in the dim future would bring communistic liberation to imperial Japan.

The effect of this propaganda on the Nips has been negligible. A few isolated garrisons have found it expedient to give up their arms, but in several cases small detachments have fought overwhelming Communist forces until exterminated rather than surrender or be incorporated into a "Liberation" Army.

Pending the arrival of the Americans in force, the Japanese in the Peiping-Tientsin-Tsingtao area were held responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in the interim between Japan's capitulation and the formal surrender of the armed forces in North China. They executed this mission smartly and efficiently. The Marines found the Japs admirably disciplined. Still proud, they felt no guilt. In their own minds, they were an unbeaten army forced to withdraw through circumstances not of their own making.

Harder to understand is the status of the many irregular troops in North China, a grand confusion of puppets, guerrillas, mercenaries, partisans, militia, and bandits.

The "puppet" troops were Jap-controlled Chinese troops. Now that Japan has been beaten, most puppet units have been quick to announce their allegiance to the Central Government. In some cases, they have been incorporated into the Nationalist Army as a unit, otherwise they have been disbanded and used as replacements.

This is strictly in line with established Chinese custom. In their pragmatic approach to war, a prisoner is non-effective, a consumer without profits; therefore, it is much better to strengthen your own army by inducting captured or surrendered troops. Most Chinese soldiers are realists; their ideologies are thin; one army is pretty much the same as another.

Then there are the many private armies. Because of the chaotic condition of communication and transportation, practically a feudal government of city-states exists. Each mayor is actually a military governor enforcing his local law with his own personal troops and his police, which are themselves a quasi-military organization.

Throughout all of North China an undetermined but large number of out-and-out bandits roam, claiming various political affiliations as a mask for their pillaging and robbing. It is fantastically true that many of these robber bands are as large, as well-organized, and as well-equipped as regular units of either the Communist or Nationalist armies.

END

Information into Intelligence

Modern military leaders have learned to appreciate that information constitutes intelligence only after it has been properly interpreted.

By Capt William H. Whyte, Jr.

THE U.S.A. has suddenly become quite intelligence conscious. This subject, previously identified in the public mind with E. Phillips Oppenheim, svelte Oriental half-castes, and shifty characters around the gaming tables at Monte Carlo, has now become a favorite theme for the popular journalists and radio commentators.

The current cry for an efficient and highly centralized intelligence bureau is healthy in that G-2 work for once is getting the attention it rarely received in postwar periods. Americans have habitually looked upon such activities as rather unsporting and better suited to what we like to think of as less honest and altruistic nations. But the necessity for it has become obvious to all, and while lacking the pressure of war, there will be constant stimuli and motivation for those engaged in this type of work. What is the significance of the reports of the new "iron" mines developed in the northern part of country 'X"? Why has country "Z" begun subsidizing so many radio factories?

But while the reasons for high level strategic intelligence are manifest in our peacetime divisions, regiments and battalions, there is no palpable objective for spurring interest in the more prosaic work of combat intelligence. While there was a real enemy from whom we were constantly trying to tear away the veil, the lowliest private could be impressed with the importance of accurate reporting, a knowledge of the enemy's tactics and organization, and the like. Now, however, the enemy has again become a hypothetical "Red" or "Blue" force, his tables of organization strangely similar to our own, and his usual habitat somewhere around Chopawamsic Creek or Independent Hill. In a word, he is very dull.

UNDER such conditions, only the most rigorous application of imagination and energy can maintain interest in small-unit intelligence work. Its only purpose is preparation for actual combat in some distant future with an enemy whose identity we do not know. It is not immediate—proficiency cannot be measured as can a man's skill with a rifle or a machine gun. It is almost an abstraction. There must also be the natural feeling that the intelligence techniques and tools developed in the Pacific war wil become outmoded as atomic energy, rockets, and electronics become further developed.

But we do know that despite changing methods of warfare there are certain unchanging fundamentals. The physical application of tactics, for instance, may undergo radical changes, but the basic principles are as valid now and will be as valid in the future as they were centuries ago.

So it is with intelligence—the observation post of 1960 may be a remote controlled television apparatus, and the other tools as greatly changed, but the underlying principles will hold true, even in such an event as a Marine battalion mixing it up in pressurized suits with an enemy force bent on seizing the Navy's radar station on the moon.

The universality of tactics is generally conceded, but intelligence doctrine is a fairly recent development. Not being as firmly rooted in military history as tactics, there is all the more reason for underscoring its importance in peactime training. Even the heart of modern intelligence theory—the process by which raw information is turned into intelligence—has been practiced only recently.

FOR illustration, let us look at the Civil War. The most cursory review causes wonder at the uniformly poor intelligence common on both sides. While there was no paucity of information, the leaders were extremely haphazard in their use of it. Except for reports from their scouts and cavalry, they fought their battles on odds and ends of news picked up as they made their tour of the lines, from what they saw personally by being their own observation post, and from what local inhabitants had to offer, the latter being almost invariably incorrect.

In the memoirs of a member of Stonewall Jackson's staff, there is an excellent example of intelligence staff work of the day. His army drawn up before the Union-held Front Royal, Jackson was surveying the situation before ordering an attack, as he knew little of the enemy's strength and dispositions. Just then his staff perceived a girl clad in white making her way up from the town towards Jackson's CP. An officer sent out to meet her found her to be the glamorous Confederate sympathizer, Belle Boyd. Belle had made good use of her charms and was crammed with information elicited from unwary Union officers. Jackson was delighted with the information, promptly ordered the attack, and took Front Royal.

Civil War accounts are full of descriptions of similar G-2 staff work. Often successful, more often not, such incidents illustrate the complete lack of system for collecting and processing information. Under Washington, some 80 years before, there had been a much more sustained effort to systematize the collection of intelligence. His instructions to his agents concerning the data he

desired on British activities in New York reads almost like a "school solution" intelligence plan.

Yet the Civil War offered far more opportunities for the development of first rate G-2 work. The terrain was ideal for observation, there were prisoners taken in almost every engagement, telegraphy speeded communications, and, due to its being a civil war, there was fertile ground for espionage. There may not have been quality but there was plenty of quantity.

There was no real intelligence for a simple reason. In no unit was there *one authority* responsible for collecting all the scraps of information from various sources—patrols, civilians, prisoners—and lumping them together in an information "pool" where in the mass they might make some sense. Often there was a multiplicity of items which together might have given a good picture of the enemy's activities, but treated individually meant nothing or were often misleading.

IN modern doctrine this is the first step in the production of information. It is a tedious job and always will be. The temptation to neglect it as "unnecessary paper work" is strong, but the officer who feels this way will find his information becomes quite elusive—one item scribbled on the back of an envelope, another jotted down on an aerial photo, others entrusted to his memory—thus getting lost in the shuffle in very short order.

It's not the system itself that is important but the fact that *a* system is used. Officers, who have struggled with journals during CPXs, know that only a set routine deters them from saying the devil with it all and throwing the bushelfuls of messages and overlays into the fire. True, enlisted personnel do the actual work of keeping a journal, but the responsibility lies with the commander and his G-2.

There are many ways to keep a journal; every intelligence officer may have his own pet method, depending on the exigencies of the situation, the size of his echelon, the number of men in his section, and, of course, the vagaries of his commanding officer. What really counts is that there is some fixed procedure by which all incoming information (as well as pertinent outgoing data) is grouped together chronologically.

Sheer routine, yes, but vital. Only a few years ago, an American battalion, because of an extremely wide frontage in face of an impending Japanese attack, threw almost all of its headquarters personnel into the line, thus effectively dissolving the intelligence section. Immediately after a heavy enemy attack, an officer, previously given up for lost, staggered back into the lines after a night spent hidden in the Japanese command post. He was able, before being taken to the hospital to point out virtually every major enemy gun position hidden in the foliage 800 yards away. Yet, it was not until several hours later that these guns were "rediscovered," and then after they had fired with devastating effect on our tanks. What was the reason for this lapse? The vital information had been available in time, but there was no collating agency to shepherd it along to the proper quarters. Information, unless recorded immediately, leads a very short life.

If we've kept a journal efficiently all of the vital data has been recorded. But it doesn't mean very much. The gold is pretty well buried amidst the plain ore of routine messages. The significant begins to take shape, however, when we start classifying the data according to subject matter.

The process of taking all of the heterogeneous items and sorting them into their proper pigeonhole is best done by use of the worksheet. With it we accomplish two things: first, we arrange the information so that all data bearing on a particular subject, such as artillery or enemy order of battle, is grouped together for easy reference and comparison; secondly, when the time comes to draft a periodic report, most of the work has already been done, and we can lift the report section by section from the worksheet.

While the journal is an official document, the worksheet is a strictly personal memorandum. It can be in any form that's convenient—manila folders, a loose-leaf notebook, or in book form. Likewise the subject headings will occur naturally, depending on the nature of the enemy and the terrain. The topics that interested us in the war against th Japanese, such as "Barges," "Kamikaze units," "Special Naval Landing Forces," etc., were not the same as those of importance in the European Theater; future wars may find some strange subjects indeed. Perhaps then corps and division headquarters may be equipped with automatic machines for recording and classifying incoming data, much like the machines that sort and file fingerprints, but the principle will remain the same. Get the data recorded, then classify it.

BUT if a worksheet renders obvious what is vital, a well-kept situation map makes it fairly jump out at you. Better than any combat example is the story of the detective called in to solve a particularly vexing series of robberies being committed in Philadelphia. Days of study revealed no clues, yet the robberies continued as regularly as clockwork on every third night. Stumped, the detective finally procured a large scale map of the city and began methodically plotting the location of each of the robberies. Finished, he gasped in amazement—the red dots he had placed on the map formed a large but yet uncomplete circle, every "X" equi-spaced from the other. Using what was apparently the thieves' formula for selecting their objectives, he determined the remaining sites on their agenda. His calculations were correct for they walked into the trap he set for them.

A good situation map is an easily readable one, containing all of the pertinent data that can be

geographically plotted, but uncluttered with a mass of extraneous detail. On a small unit's situation map, it's rare that there is much definite information of the enemy that can be penciled on. For that reason, it is all the more important that the map be kept simple so that what is known won't be virtually hidden by a rainbow of symbols denoting nothing more vital than where at 1720 a 2d Platoon, L Company patrol found an abandoned enemy rifle.

SINCE combat intelligence is greatly concerned with terrain not under our control, significant data about the ground ahead should be plotted on the map, and, if there is much of it, perhaps on a separate terrain map. No matter how accurate a map may be, it rarely contains the detailed sort of information about rivers, marshes, etc., so important to small unit commanders. A patrol may return with a report of a brisk skirmish which took place after they had crossed several streams and a swamp. In almost every case, the intelligence officer will assiduously plot all the data about the enemy but often fail to note down the facts about the depth of the streams and the passability of the swamp. It will, of course, as a consequence soon be forgotten. Yet a week after, with our unit advancing, the depth of the rivers might be more crucial than the location of a few odd enemy.

Like the journal and the worksheet, the situation map may be kept in many different ways. In battalions and regiments, it is usually combined with the Three's operation map, while in diivsions and corps it is kept separately. However it is kept, it should be readily available to all members of the staff for study and reference.

By now we have recorded the incoming information and have gotten it into workable form by classifying it by subject in the worksheet as well as plotting it on our situation map. So far, however, the process has been a purely mechanical one, easily performed by well-trained clerks. The first catalyst in the mental process by which we transform raw information into intelligence is the application of the test for credibility. Can we believe this item?

The process is perhaps instinctive and we may not even be aware that we've applied the test, for the questions are ones that naturally occur to us. What about the person who reported this information—has previous experience shown him to be a reliable source? Under the conditions at the time, could the information actually have been obtained?

Who reported the information? In an article published in the early part of the war, a correspondent gave the "low-down" on the horrors of Jap fighting on New Georgia. He told how almost every Jap spoke English, some with highly perfected Southern, New England, and Brooklyn accents; how they knew the nicknames of our personnel and used every chance to lure the unsuspecting. He wrote also of the Japs' uncanny ability to wander about our lines undetected, dropping grenades into selected foxholes and whispering threats into the ears of the men. The most illuminating part of the entire article was his statement at the end that it was a highly accurate one since the details had been furnished him by eye-witnesses—eye-witnesses whom he interviewed in the sick bay prior to their evacuation for "combat fatigue"! The G-2 must be considerably more critical when he asks himself the question, "Who reported the information?"

You also want to ask yourself if previous experience shows the source to be accurate and reliable. Washington risked his entire army in a highly perilous amphibious operation on the strength of one item of information. But because the agent who gave it to him had always been correct in the past, Washington was sure that if he crossed the Delaware he would find the Hessians at Trenton steeped in alcohol—which he did.

While sizing up the source of our data is instinctive, it takes conscious effort to apply the remaining test of credibility. Under the circumstances at the time (weather, visibility, etc.) could the information actually have been obtained? There are many who love to flavor their reports with a wealth of authoritative detail, and if their eyes didn't supply it, often their imagination will. If a man who fancies himself as a whirlwind at identifying planes catches a fleeting glimpse of one the sound of whose engines he thinks he recognizes, it is amazing how quickly he will recall seeing all sorts of identifying characteristics; give him a little more time to reminisce, and he will even remember the numbers painted on the fuselage, and the more confirmed in his own mind will be his impressions.

Our natural tendency is to accept eye-witness accounts at face value. In evaluation, however, we must always remind ourselves of the limitations of man's sensory impressions. The average man is a very poor reporter.

TO underscore this point, a "hearing" test was given students at the Command and Staff School at Quantico. They were told that a recording had been made at a Jap prisoner of war camp in Hawaii, and that several hundred Japs had obligingly staged a mock "Banzai" charge, using the American slang phrases their officers had taught them to use against the Marines. It was explained that Nipponese exuberance was fanned by battle sounds provided by a public address system, but the "charge" restrained by a barbed wire enclosure.

The instructor told the class there were about 17 recognizable slang phrases, the most easily heard being "Blood!" "Marine, you die!" "Death!" and "Stupid Fool!" The lights were turned low, the class otld to jot down only the phrases they clearly heard, and the record started. After each burst of frenzied Nip yelling, there would be a prodigious amount of scribbling by the students, their heads nodding wisely as they spotted the different phrases.

After the record had been played,a show of hands (and a later tabulation of their notes) indicated almost all of them heard the phrases mentioned before the playing of the record, not to mention a number of additional and rather unusual ones such as "Yankee Pig!" " Marine, you yellow!" and "You die for Hirohito!"

The students, invariably well pleased with themselves at this point, were then startled to hear the instructor explain that he had been lying all the time. The record was not made in Hawaii but from the sound track of a pre-war Japanese feature picture in which there wasn't a single word of English!

What had happened? A germ had been planted, unfairly perhaps, in their minds. They were given a premise and when it came to particular cases, their imaginations unconsciously interpreted those particulars to fit that premise. If a group of senior officers in the Olympian detachment of the classroom can thus be fooled by their senses, how much more must we question the credibility of eye-witnesses in the field.

This fallability of man's senses has been proved time and again. (Recall only the recent case of the innocent man imprisoned for years on the strength of a vague resemblance to a New York bogus check artist.) The necessary corollary is that in evaluating an item of information by asking ourselves questions about the sources we must be governed in regarding the human being as an accurate reporter by the most profound skepticism.

Now that we have evaluated an item for credibility, we then test it for accuracy. This test is primarily one of comparison, and hence is done almost automatically if we've been careful in our previous classification. For the map and the worksheet should make obvious if the item is corroborated by other sources and how it compares with information known to be correct. If the items are at variance, the worksheet and the situation may are the principal aids in determining which is correct.

After a week's extensive patrolling in preparation for a large scale attack, an Army S-2 found on his situation map a cluster of seven red machine gun symbols grouped on one end of a prominent ridge, but a complete absence of any on the other end. This at once raised in his mind a question as to the accuracy of the patrol reports' coordinates. On the possibility that each patrol had reported the same gun, but inaccurately as to location, he dispatched a special patrol to the area, and thus found it was held by only one machine gun, and not the seven as it had previously seemed. In this instance, mere routine classification had graphically brought to his attention an inaccuracy.

What have we done so far? Merely taken the raw information as it has come in bit by bit, made sure it was put down in black and white before it was forgotten, and then grouped the items under the different topics of interest to us. Each item has been evaluated for credibility and accuracy, with nothing taken for granted. A simple process, but one which would never take place unless a system, whatever its mechanics, had been adopted. At this stage, it is still relatively undistilled, still information, the transformation into intelligence awaiting the final and most difficult process of all—interpretation.

(This is the first of two articles on transforming information into intelligence.)

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The Occupation Marine

It is the duty of the occupying forces to carry out their assigned military functions in a dignified, fair and firm manner. But there are numerous pitfalls to avoid.

By Maj J. A. Donovan

WITH the surprisingly sudden end of World War II, the Marine Corps and Army units in the Pacific had to make an immediate change of plans and attitudes in regards to the defeated enemy—Japan. Almost overnight, invasion plans were scrapped for occupation plans while small units and individuals' active hatred of a vicious enemy had to be changed to the more benevolent attitudes of a just conqueror and military policeman.

Asiatic police and guard duty is not new to the Marine Corps, but it is new to many of the young marines who are destined to serve in occupation forces. Along with their Army brothers in occupied Germany, these marines face many new problems unthought of in boot camp or training area. The officers will have an even greater problem, for their's is the responsibility of carrying out policy, setting standards, and supervising the troops who are representing the will and character of the American people in the very yards of a defeated nation.

Criticism and comments concerning our occupation performance in Nazi Germany would indicate that this duty does not come easily to the average American, that we have much to learn, and that the good fighting man is not necessarily a good policeman or ambassador for his country.

The tasks of occupation duty and military government are many and the causes of these problems are varied. In spite of the fact that the services are supplied with specially trained military government teams, the great bulk of the occupation work is carried on by the occupation divisions; the officers, the men, and the all-important interpreters.

The problem, as usual, centers around the small unit. Regardless of the fine plans, elaborate directives, or foreign policy, it is the man in the ranks and the small unit's officers who are the final executors of the occupation policy. They are the average American; probably only hastily indoctrinated in the vagaries of military ocupation duty, homesick and impatient to return to the States, interested primarily in their own creature comforts and appetites, hardly concerned with the problem of the defeated nation nor in the efforts of his own country to solve them. In order to prevent these Americans from becoming merely disgruntled tourists reflecting but small credit upon America and its military, it is essential that the many problems and methods of carrying out occupation duty be explained to them. As usual, the military can carry out its duties properly only by means of indoctrination, discipline, and supervision.

Marine units on duty in the Orient will for some time have many tasks other than their usual mission of protecting American lives and property, but whether their duties take the form of standing guard over American naval establishments, military occupation of Japan, or garrison duty in friendly China, there will be many similarities in means and methods of solving their new problems.

The occupation marine must be thoroughly indoctrinated with the idea that his task is primarily a military one. He has been assigned a job to do as the uniformed representative of the United States. He is the executor of policy and not the formulator. It is not the job of the military to attempt to sell the people of the occupied country on American democracy—but merely to carry out their assigned military functions in a dignified, fair and firm manner.

In order to have a better understanding of the problems confronting occupation forces and to facilitate handling them, Marine officers and the men should receive instruction in the character of the peoples and the nature of their special problems.

For example: in the Orient, Americans start with the advantage of considerable prestige. Our modern mechanical civilization and our successes in the recent war are very impressive. It is part of the task of the Marines to enhance this prestige. Politeness, a certain recognition of Oriental deviousness, particularly in conversation, an ability to discriminate between the characters of different natives, and a willingness to give respect and delegate authority to those civilians who are worthy of it, are essential requisites for a military occupying authority.

Author's Note: The material for this article was based primarily on information contained in the following publications: The Public Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 4; "The Occupation of Enemy Territory." Riot Control *by Colonel Wood, USA. FM 27-5 Joint Army-Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs. FM 19-5, Military Police. FM 19-10 Military Police in Towns and Cities.*

Conversely, any display of weakness within the ranks of our military forces is noticed immediately by the people of a nation that has any military traditions at all. Such infractions as lack of saluting, fraternization between the ranks, drunkenness in public, undignified behavior by officers, and unseemly fraternization with the native peoples, all lower the prestige of the military.

Bearded and unkempt marines won their battles through skill, but the sloppy-looking marine is not impressive in any country at peace. All civilians expect soldiers to be in uniform and neat in appearance. The "spit and polish" marine will be more immediately impressive than is his skill with a machine gun.

By a study of the occupied countries' police methods and by a knowledge of how their military functions in handling discipline and civil problems, our forces can more readily see the pattern that our techniques should approximate in dealing with these people. It is a fact that candy bars and kindness are not the most effective weapons and are often interpreted as signs of weakness. The military must be firm and just; that is what is expected of them. The civilian missionaries of religion, business, and government can be the dispensers of charity and good will. But at best, there is no sense in believing that an occupying force will ever make itself beloved by the occupied; it can do much, however, to lose the respect of the occupied people.

Periods of social and economic transition such as are experienced by nations under post-war occupation are generally characterized by sporadic outbursts of some sections of the population which must be controlled as soon as possible in the interest of general order, community welfare, or the maintenance of the prestige of the governing authority. Civil disturbance puts the military to its severest test, demanding skill on the part of the small units and their leaders who are called upon to cope with them. Experience in combat is of little value at this time, except in that it may give confidence to the troops facing these situations.

The greatest asset that the military has in dealing with civil disturbance is organization and discipline. Coordinated action is usually absent in civilian or irregular units and so is respected and impressive when displayed by the military.

However, before the military has to use force, it should employ certain psychological means that may be effective in discouraging civil disturbances before they start. In addition to understanding the local problems, and maintaining an impressive military appearance, the occupation units should constantly keep abreast of the local situation, anticipating trouble before it starts, and have plans of action ready for execution.



Even a beaten enemy must be handled with skill and confidence.

The mood and conduct of the local population is usually a direct reflection of their morale. A bewildered and hopeless citizenry is potentially dangerous. The occupation forces must not only be aware of these moods and make every effort to control and influence public morale, but they should be ready to "nip" any revolutionary or disturbing influence "in the bud."

Friendliness towards the common people is entirely compatible with strict policing to preserve the peace, however, probably more damage can be done to America's public relations by an unconscious patronage of native populations than in any other way. Marines must be taught that although

they think that American standards of living, culture, and conduct are the best, the peoples of other countries do not always agree and are particularly sensitive to any assumed superiority or arrogance on the part of the military in their advantageous position as conquerors or uninvited occupation forces.

This sensitiveness toward American forces can be overcome in a number of ways. Marines should be warned against showing amusement or contempt toward local customs. By attempting to learn the local language, the troops can not only allay suspicion but will give the native some feeling of confidence. An effort to appreciate the local customs, art, and scenery are quickly noted by the local inhabitants and the usual American kindness towards children is always disarming.

But the basic element that the military must realize is that they have to permit the individual to feel that he is participating in his own destiny. The people must be given reason to have hope in their future way of life. Without hope, the peoples of a disorganized and war-torn country will have only suspicion, hatred and bewilderment that will result in hostility towards the occupying troops and in acts of violence.

Once the military unit is committed to action in dealing with civil disturbances, it must act swiftly, capitalizing on surprise and demonstrating complete confidence and decision.

Unless the opposing forces offer armed resistance. use only normal small arms—the rifle with fixed bayonet being the most effective psychologically. Men armed with pistols or carbines should also carry clubs or pick-ax handles.

Among unfriendly populations, Marine MPs, patrols, or guards in civil areas should operate in groups of two or more. In dealing with mobs or riots, small Marine units keep closed up in wedge or squad column formation, facing the demonstrators with fixed bayonets.

The sight of uniformed and armed units moving in compact formations with apparent firm purpose will usually quiet the actions of a mob. Should the appearance of troops and the directions of the officer-in-charge fail to dispel an unruly gathering or stop civilian acts of violence, then tear-gas is most effective. Should tear-gas or the threat of our weapons fail to break up a demonstration, a few well-placed and controlled rounds may be fired. General firing upon a civilian group should only be a last resort.

Small groups of marines, regardless of how armed, should never let themselves be drawn into hand-to-hand conflict with superior numbers of hostile civilians as they lose the strength of their organization and disciplined appearance and are usually overwhelmed by superior numbers.

In summary, military occupation demands a good psychology and intelligence in dealing with the native peoples--but should peaceful methods fail and violent action become necessary it should be executed quickly, efficiently and thoroughly, leaving no doubt as to the masters of the situation.

Military, disciplined appearance is important.

Occupation duties present many possibilities for the Marine Corps to enhance its reputation as an organization capable and ready for any assignment in war or peace. However, the problems of peace will call for the same high standard of planning and performance and the same professional training and indoctrination of the young officer and marine that typified our efforts in the recent war. END



A Bigger "Ditch"

The Panama Canal has reaped military honors in two World Wars but the strain is beginning to tell, as the tight squeezes felt by our carriers in World War II demonstrate.

By Maj R. Z. Kirkpatrick, USA, ret'd

NEXT August 15, the Panama Canal will begin its 33rd year of operation, having twice reaped military honors for its pioneer planners. Its importance in the recent war was indeed vital, even more so than in World War I. It has ended its exclusively military status and is again being used for commercial shipping. Shortly after the SS Steel Exporter on October 10, 1938 became the 100,000 commercial ship over 300 tons to pass through the Canal, the total tolls had exceeded the Canal's construction cost.

Changes in the Canal are needed because not only Great Britain's liners *Queen Mary* and *Queen Elizabeth* but also some of our own new carriers are too wide for the Canal's locks. The beams of the Lexington and Saratoga were so wide that their 1½-foot clearance of the 110-foot chambers was almost a drive fit. During the late stages of the war, Seabees herded two 124-foot wide floating drydocks through to the Pacific but had to tow them through with the drydocks lying laterally.

The most recent work on the Canal, begun in the field on July 1, 1940, was amply justified but came a little late. The $277,000,000 Third Lock project includes over ten miles of new by-pass channel and 140-foot locks.

Wartime shortages of skilled construction workers, equipment and materials halted the work. In 1942, plans were changed, many contracts were cancelled and the work was confined almost exclusively to excavation. Only $70,000,000 of the appropriation has been expended.

Now the whole project is being restudied with the intent of incorporating the gist of the war's experience into the plans. The study must be completed by 31 December.

Air Support Techniques

Army and Navy control methods differ in that Army procedure is planned primarily for land-mass warfare while the Navy's meets amphibious problems.

By LtCol Keith B. McCutcheon

DURING the last two years of the war in the Pacific, there were two systems being employed for the control of aircraft in air support operations: the method of the Navy as exemplified at Iwo and Okinawa and the method of the Army as executed in the Philippines.

There are several differences between these two methods of control for air support but the greatest single difference is the apparent lack of centralization of control in the Army system. This can best be explained by taking into consideration the tactical employment of the supported ground troops, the tactical employment of the Air Force, and the air support system organization.

Marine Corps operations in the Pacific were all amphibious in the true sense of the word. The landings were on small geographic land-masses; naval units stood by to provide naval gunfire and air support; the enemy fought from defensive positions, highly organized in depth; the entire land-mass was virtually the battlefield; the number of attacking troops was of division or corps strength; tactics called for speed and aggressive action to bring the campaign to a swift conclusion.

The more important Army operations, on the other hand, passed through the amphibious stage rather rapidly and became pure land-mass warfare. Land-masses of such size were involved that the enemy could fall back from the beaches and defend from successive positions; naval gunfire and carrier-based aircraft were not employed beyond the establishment of the beachhead; speed and aggressive action were not as important as in Marine operations and for this reason attacking troops could be held up or withdrawn from intensive actions for the purpose of employing air support.

AT Okinawa, there was a combined operation involving the Tenth Army with both Army, Navy and Marine units. However, Okinawa was a relatively small land-mass and the campaign was conducted as an amphibious operation.

Previous to the Philippine invasion, the Army was engaged in a series of campaigns for the purpose of getting bases to support the Philippine landings. The primary missions of the Air Forces during this time were the strategic bombing of distant land-masses and the isolation of the battlefield by tactical bombing. The need for close air support was not urgent and the ground troops received a negligible amount of it.

In the Army air support organization, the fundamental unit was the Support Air Party (SAP). The SAP usually consisted of two officers and 20 enlisted men; it was attached by an air force from a Tactical Air Communication (TAC) Squadron to divisions and higher echelons for the purpose of coordinating air strike requests and for the purpose of directing air strikes.

The officers were rated observers and had had combat flying. The enlisted men were qualified to handle the duties of CW operators, HF voice operators, radio mechanics, cryptographers, clerks, and auto mechanics.

The administrative and tactical control of the SAP remained with the air force; rations, billeting, maintenance were supplied by the ground force unit to which they were assigned. The radio equipment of the party consisted of two AN/VRC sets mounted in jeeps and one SCR-399 mounted in a 2-1/2 ton truck or Dukw.

AIR Liaison Parties (ALPs), similar to those employed in the Navy organization, were supposed to be organic within the ground units but actually few divisions had qualified or trained parties to perform the duties of the ALP. Joint Assault Signal Companies (JASCOs) were provided for assault units in the operations but, because of their limited availability, the JASCO units were usually pulled out shortly after the landing and assigned to another operation.

In the Philippines, the Marine Air Groups operating under the Army Air Forces organized their own parties and sent them out to work with the divisions being supported by Marine dive bombers.

Requests for strikes originated with battalion or regiment and passed through the chain of command to the division. The division SAP received the request and coordinated with the two and three sections for approval before sending it on to corps and army. Corps or army (whichever was the highest command present) would then pass the request to the highest air force headquarters present. The A-3 assigned the mission to a subordinate air unit for briefing and conduct.

This system was of course time consuming and the chances of getting an urgent request through for action in ten or 15 minutes were slim. In order to expedite matters, a few modifications were put into effect which paralleled the Navy Air Support Control Unit (ASCU) system.

In the first place, the highest ground unit present could and usually did delegate the next lower echelons as the highest coordinating activities. Thus Army could have the corps coordinate division re-

quests and forward them direct to air force. If corps was the largest unit, it could delegate the authority to the divisions; and in some instances where a single division was the highest ground echelon it could permit the regiments to request direct from air forces.

These three possibilities actually occurred when the Marine Air Groups were operating in the Philippines. Sixth Army in Luzon, 10th Corps in Mindanao, and the 41st Division in Zamboanga permitted the next lower units to request direct from the air units but they still remained in control of the net and could step in and modify the requests as necessary. In the latter two instances, the Marine Air Groups were the highest air force units present so the time factor was reduced to a minimum and strikes were delivered with dispatch.

IN large land-mass warfare, such as the Army was participating in on Luzon, the divisions were placed in a non-continuous line extending well over 100 miles. With the aircraft available for employment in this theater, the general use of air alerts would have been a waste of air power. It was more expeditious to prearrange strikes and to schedule ground alerts to cover urgent requests.

If the tactical situation required it, however, corps could and did request air alerts to work directly with divisions that were actively engaged. The classic example was the work of the First Cavalry Division which had dawn-to-dusk air alerts of nine Marine scout bombers (SBDs) for nearly five weeks. Manila was the primary objective at the time so the greatest emphasis was placed on supporting divisions assigned to the assault of that city. Later the emphasis swung to divisions in the WaWa-Lubac sector northeast of Manila and the Balete Pass area in eastern and central Luzon.

When air support was handled with these modifications in effect, the division or corps SAP approached the Navy ASCU but with diminished responsibilities and duties. They did not have to worry about fighter direction, air-sea rescue, anti-sub patrol or such other functions of ASCU. They had one duty—close air support.

The SAPs usually directed strikes from a command post out of sight of the target area by the use of maps and photos. Although this is not a good procedure, it worked, after a fashion, if the strike leaders had been well briefed and if panels and smoke were employed to mark the target.

The ALPs were not allowed to direct the strike because they were ground personnel and not air force. The Marine units that were placed in the front lines were permitted to exercise control because they came from air units. The importance of having direction exercised from as near the target as possible later brought on a plan for a reorganization of the system. The SAPs were to be provided with two Forward Control Teams (FCT) who were to be equipped to move up to the front to direct air strikes.

Liaison from the ground units to the air units was excellent. Well-qualified infantry and artillery officers were attached to the air staffs for the purpose of keeping the air unit advised on the ground situation and they cooperated on the briefing of pilots.

In addition to the SAP officer at division headquarters, Ground Liaison Officers (GLO) were also attached to divisions and higher echelons to perform the duties of unit air officers. The GLO and the SAP together comprised the unit air section of the staff. The GLOs generally were graduates of the GLO school at Key Field, Miss., or had had considerable combat experience.

There is much to say in support of this centralization of control in the Division SAPs. Many officers, including marines, firmly believe that a battalion or a regiment is too small a unit to handle air power and that the division should be the smallest unit to request the use of it.

THE present practice in the Navy system only requires higher intervening echelons to act on a request in a negative manner and does not call for any definite positive approval. As a result of this, there have been occasions when the ASCU was confronted with more requests for air strikes than there were strike plans available. Had the divisions acted on every request and assigned priorities, this con dition may have been partially alleviated.

In order to correlate the two systems into a workable one that will be applicable to all branches, a joint committee was appointed by the War and Navy Departments to draw up a doctrine for the employment of air support. It has been completed and covers all stages of an operation from the purely amphibious to the land-mass stage. At the present time, it is pending the approval of the various services. END

Air Observation Training Open

To continue the Air Observation program in the Marine Corps, the Air Observation School has been established at the Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va. The Second Basic Class commences on 6 May 1946. According to Letter of Instruction No. 1170. there are openings for 15 students. Officers of the rank of major or below interested in volunteering for air observation duty should submit their requests through official channels to the Commandant of the Marine Corps immediately. Officers detailed to air observation duty can expect to serve in that capacity for a period of at least one year and will be eligible for the extra compensation prescribed by current regulations.

Action Report: BATAAN

A first-hand story of a Marine platoon in the heroic defense of the Philippines from the first bombing of Manila until the American surrender.

By 1stLt William F. Hogaboom

1stLt William F. Hogaboom, from whose highly detailed action report this article was taken, was born at Vicksburg, Miss., in 1915. Having served as a sergeant in the Mississippi National Guard while still in high school, he enlisted in the Marine Corps and in 1934 was appointed to the U. S. Naval Academy. After a year's preparatory work at Mississippi State, Lt Hogaboom entered Annapolis in 1935. Graduating in 1939, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps. After Basic School in Philadelphia, he was assigned to the Legation Guard in Peiping, China. In 1941 he was transferred to the Marine Barracks, Cavite, P. I. When the Japs invaded the Philippines, Lt Hogaboom had charge of an AA battery, but found himself an infantry officer more often than a battery commander. He was awarded the Navy Cross for extraordinary heroism at Mariveles Point. With the fall of the Philippines, Lt Hogaboom was captured and confined at Cabatuan Prison Camp #1 until autumn 1944, when he was placed aboard a prison transport, scheduled for evacuation to the Japanese home islands. This ship was bombed and sunk by Allied airmen in the waters off Olangapo in December. Lt Hogaboom freed himself from the sinking wreckage and swam ashore, but died shortly thereafter as a result of overexposure and malnutrition.

(Editor's note: The anti-aircraft defenses of the Navy Yard, Cavite, which included a Marine battalion of three batteries of 3"-.50 guns and one battery of .50 calibre machine guns, had been alerted since 14 October, 1941.)

AT 0400, the 8th of December, I received telephone orders from the battalion commander, LtCol J. P. Adams, to man stations. As stations were being manned and tested, LtCol Adams arrived and informed me there was an unconfirmed report that Honolulu had been bombed. We cut fuzes, going into the last stage of readiness. About dawn, the QM truck brought helmets and gas masks. No receipt was asked for this equipment by the QM Sgt. We really knew that the war had started.

Btry A then consisted of one officer (myself) and about 60 men with 16 men of Btry D attached. We had four Navy shipboard type, fixed base, non-director controlled, dual purpose 3"-.50 guns, with altimeter and control charts. Btry D men manned four water-cooled .50-cal machine guns on heavy mounts affording local protection. With 60 men, we were so under strength that only the control group and three of the 4-3" guns could be effectively manned.

About mid-morning, a flash alarm was received that enemy planes were over San Fernando headed south. However, nothing was sighted that day. Work on the revetments was rushed. We were notified that all friendly planes would approach Cavite flying low, and from the north across the bay. Orders were issued later that day that we were to fire only on planes positively identified as enemy. At about 0100 on the 9th, motors were heard in the west. Stations were manned and faint glimmers of the bright moon on the metal could be detected as planes passed low and directly overhead to bomb Nichols Field across the bay.

The next morning, 2dLt Van Ray with 20 men joined the battery. A crew for the fourth 3"-.50 was formed from these men under one experienced corporal. The intention was to break in these men with instructions and reorganize for four guns. This crew, however, with one day's instruction fired so satisfactorily during the raid on Cavite next day that on their own request they remained intact.

About 1300 on the 10th, air alarm having been sounded, a flight of 27 planes was sighted over Manila. This flight, with dive bombers and fighters escorting, bombed Nichols Field. They were engaged by a few of our fighters. One of our P-40s made a dead stick landing in the shallow water south of Cavite. Two PBYs took off from Sangley Point. Two Japanese dive bombers took after them and, I understand, badly damaged one before being engaged by a P-40. This latter P-40 soon was noticed heading back over Sangley Point with a Japanese plane well in the rear. We opened fire (3") on this plane and had the satisfaction of seeing it go down in Manila Bay.

The next hour was a pretty terrific one as the Japanese turned their full attention to the Navy Yard. We opened zone fire on the first flight to head over Cavite. This flight was at moderate altitude and turned away. All subsequent flights were at about 25,000 feet altitude. We fired two more rounds and then held our fire as it was all too obvious that they were considerably out of range. The entire first stick landed on the water. Most of the second did likewise. Thereafter, stick after stick (total about 9) crisscrossed the yard as what appeared to be three flights of 24 to 27 planes each took turns making runs.

As stick after stick cut its path through the yard, fires sprang up in every section. Naval Ammunition Depot seemed to be the only major unit

of the yard untouched, and it was soon gravely endangered by the spreading flames. Explosions of ammunition, gasoline dumps, etc., sent billows of flame and debris high into the air long after the bombing was over. One huge column of dense, black smoke swirled up from the conflagration, passing between us and the sun. The sun was reduced to a deep red disk, dramatically symbolizing the origin of the destruction below.

A few stray bombs struck Sangley Point near El Veraclero causing only slight damage. We were untouched and free to watch the whole show. When the first stick was loosened above we could, at first, make out only the silvery twinkling of the sun on the bomb. We jumped to the conclusion that they were leaflets until someone yelled, "Leaflets hell! They're billboards. Hit the deck!" We did and became veterans.

After this bombing, Cavite was abandoned except for minor operation of NAD, etc. Naval Hospital was transferred from Canacao to Manila, most of naval aviation went to Laguna de Bay, and PNAB ceased operation. By the 19th, very little activity was left in the area. During this interval, 10th to 19th, enemy formations were sighted from time to time, usually bombing Nichols Field.

About 1330 on the 19th, shortly after the alarm sounded, a flight of bombers appeared from the south. One stick was laid across Sangley Point at the radio station. A half-hour later, the planes appeared again to lay another stick across the same area. The naval radio station was destroyed and large quantities of gasoline and oil stored in drums about the golf course were set aflame. Our section of the point was again untouched.

The 1st Separate Marine Battalion was ordered to evacuate the Cavite area and proceed to Bataan. On the afternoon of the 22nd, Btry A received its orders and got under way, leaving both 3" guns and machine guns to be accounted for by NAD personnel. (Our machine guns reached Corregidor—the 3" guns were destroyed in place.) That night, we reached Section Base, Mariveles. At dawn, we again moved out and proceeded to the area near the crossing of the Pucot River by the Mariveles cut-off. There the 1st Separate Marine Battalion went into bivouac. Units of the 4th Marines were at other points along the cut-off. The 1st SepMarBn became the 3d Bn, 4th Marines on 1 January. Btry A then became part of Co K for administration.

On the 26th, our machine gunners were detached and sent to Corregidor. The remainder of the battalion excepting Btrys A and C soon followed. Btry C's guns had been salvaged from Binacayan and were set up in a rice paddy just off the road between Mariveles and Section Base. Btry C moved to this location and sat; Btry remained at "Camp Carefree" with orders to "stay there." It was, I believe, the intention that we be replacements for Btry C.

The remaining days at Camp Carefree were particularly pleasant ones. We were out of touch with the war and didn't much give a damn. Once low-flying enemy strafers came in for us to fire on with our Lewis guns and rifles and from time to time we could watch the bombing of Corregidor. Still, for a while, the war lost its personal touch.

We, of course, provided our own security. The battery was reorganized for tactical purposes, forming two platoons. On alternate days, Lt Van Ray and I took our platoons on reconnaissance patrols about the area above the camp. We expended quite a bit of effort attempting to track down what sounded like a spark gap radio set before we finally sighted a bird that chirped away in terms of dots and dashes.

On the afternoon of the 5th on orders of Col Hardee, Ord HQ USAFFE, I took two sergeants with me to the junction of West Road and Rock Road, to make a reconnaissance of the Rock Road area in which Ord HQ USAFFE was being located. The objective was to choose a bivouac area for the battery. We found the terrain in that area to be extremely rugged and poorly provided with water. The sight selected was at the RJ itself. PA troops were ordered from the area to make room for us.

About noon on the 6th, Capt Bob Wiel, Ord HQ USAFFE, camp commander, came to Camp Carefree with oral orders for the battery to move to the selected site and proceed to set up the interior guard for the Ord HQ. He affirmed that the order had been approved by naval authorities on the "Rock." That same afternoon and early evening the move was completed. The following day, the guard was organized and established. The battery was well equipped, self sustaining, and did a smooth job of setting itself up. My marines assumed considerable pride both in operating an alert, efficient guard and in putting our bivouac area into first-class shape. Our Rock Road roving sentinel gained esteem with the local troops by scoring a pin wheel at night on a wild cat that wouldn't halt. Off duty, the men converted a badly-fouled, doubtful-appearing oozing into a more than adequate pipe spring for watering many troops.

For all concerned, the short tour of duty as Ord HQ guard was accepted with enthusiasm. The spirit of cooperation existing between the Army personnel and our own was marked. On our departure, we received a letter of commendation by order of Gen MacArthur for the spirit and efficiency with which the battery had operated.

On 15 January, on receipt of written orders from Cmdr Bridget, commanding officer of Naval Bn, Mariveles, the battery secured at Ord HQ and moved to Quarantine Station, Mariveles, to become part of the naval battalion. (A Marine detachment from Corregidor arrived the next day to reestablish the guard.)

At Quarantine Station, our first and immediate mission was to provide .50-cal MG AA protection



for the construction units building the Mariveles air field. We were given nine water-cooled guns with Navy mounts for this purpose. In one afternoon, five guns with mounts and ammunition were man-handled up the steep trail to the spur overlooking Q Station and there installed; the same night three more guns were installed in flush sink pits in the field about the construction. The ninth gun was already in place in front of Q Station.

These guns surprised two Japanese dive bombers attempting to bomb Dewey dry dock in the bay in front of Q Station. One was driven off, the other left smoking and was reported to have gone down in Manila Bay en route to Manila. A couple of weeks later, several dive bombers attacked Section Base and, in departing, came under our guns. Again one left smoking heavily and was also reported to have gone down. These were the only two occasions on which we had enemy planes come within effective range. Lt Van Ray and Sgt Morgan had done a fine job of quickly organizing and training machine gun crews on the spot.

At the same time, we were carrying out our prime mission of assisting in the organizing and training of the naval battalion. On 16th and 17th of January, a total of about 65 bluejackets and one naval aviator, Lt (jg) Leso Pew, were attached to the battery and joined us at Q Station. We organized as a company of one Marine platoon (assigned to the machine guns), and two bluejacket platoons to which Marine NCOs were assigned as senior platoon NCOs and instructors. Fortunately, we began training of the latter two platoons immediately. They received the equivalent of about three full days of training in such subjects as the .30-cal rifle, bayonet, and squad tactics before the activity in the hills.

In the meantime, Lt Van Ray and I were making daily reconnaissance hikes into the hills and out on the points west of Q Station. We covered just about the whole of the area except Langaskawayan and Lapiay Pts. Those two were next on the list and would have been visited by myself on the 23rd.

At about 0800 on the 23rd, I was notified by Cmdr Bridget via telephone that Pucot Hill had been attacked by Japanese. His orders were for me to investigate. Three marines from my company were stationed on Pucot Hill, with Lt Bliss's detail, to operate an air-warning lookout. PFC McKechine was up in the lookout when machine gun fire below signaled the attack on the hill. Under fire, he reported the situation to Cmdr Bridget over his telephone then dropped from the tree and joined in the exodus from the hill.

Cmdr Bridget immediately phoned Btry C to give them the alarm, then phoned me. As I hung up and was starting out of the office, PFC McKechine arrived with an Army PFC close on his heels to report the event on the hill. The two had covered the approximate 1-1/2 kilometers from Pucot to Q Station in that "believe-it-or-not" time.

The two bluejacket platoons were then standing by for instructions. In a very few minutes the 2nd Platoon had been issued spare ammunition and

grenades and under Lt Pew shoved off with orders to proceed directly to Pucot. I took the 3rd Platoon myself and struck directly into the hills. On the hill commanding Q Station, I left one squad, under Corp Paulson, to hold that hill and the trail that passed over it. With the remainder of the patrol, we then marched north towards Pucot, sweeping the ridge line. Nothing was encountered.

Early afternoon as we were approaching Pucot itself, we heard automatic fire in that direction. I sent a runner with a report to Cmdr Bridget, then proceeded cautiously on the trail leading up to Pucot. Rifle fire broke out on our left followed shortly by a call for assistance. Understanding the call to report Japanese between the firing and the water, we immediately cut down hill to get on the Japanese rear. Deployed and sweeping up toward the firing, we came on the rear of Ensign Grundel's patrol from Btry C on the deck and firing at random into the bushes. (Grundel and his senior NCO were both wounded.) Grundel reported that they had run head-on into a small Japanese patrol on the trail and that after firing rapidly for a short while, the Japanese had withdrawn. We passed through his patrol and swept on up the ravine. The Japanese had disappeared.

We proceeded to the top of Pucot where I reported to Cmdr Bridget, via telephone, and received orders to await further word from him.

In the meantime, the 2d Platoon, after leaving Q Station, pressed rapidly to Pucot, deployed near the top and went into attack. They were met by rifle and MG fire as they approached the OP. However, as the attack was pressed, the Japanese retreated over the hill after very feeble resistance. So, within three-quarters of an hour after the initial attack on Pucot, this key-point was again in our hands. (It is my belief that but for this prompt and apparently surprising arrival of a counter-attacking force, Pucot soon would have been organized into a Japanese strong point, costly to retake and very embarrassing to the Mariveles area.)

Lt Pew left a squad to hold Pucot and started in pursuit of the Japanese. However, contact had been lost. Patrols from Btry C arrived and joined in the search. Contact was reestablished from time to time during the afternoon with the Japanese losing themselves whenever our patrols worked into a position too close. At dusk, the patrols were assembled on Pucot. Having nowhere encountered Japanese in force, it was then our opinion that only a small harassing patrol was operating in the area. Orders were received placing the patrols in position along the ridge line for a general search of the seaward slope and points on the following morning. My own patrol remained on Pucot.

Soon after dawn, we began the descent of the trail leading to Lapiay Point. Numerous Japanese trail diagrams were found. Two Japanese, who were



Marines with Springfields and old style helmets detruck for action on Bataan.

flushed and fired on, disappeared down a ravine. Arriving on the bluff above Latain Point, we swung left and proceeded to Lapiay Point.

From the bluff above Lapiay, I sent a couple of scouts out to check the small wooded area of the point itself. Just as they were about to enter the woods, they doubled back and dashed up the slope. They reported having surprised several Japanese sitting under the trees. No shots were fired.

A quick check revealed that the wooded south slope offered the only unexposed exit from or approach to the point. The open slope, about 15 yards wide, offered no cover and could be kept clear by a couple of riflemen. I left a BAR man and assistant on the bluff to cover the slope and deployed the remainder of the patrol down the south slope. When in position, we began to advance.

As the skirmish line came around a nose, we were met by close range machine gun fire. Corp Collins and I moved in to attempt to grenade this machine gun. Corp Collins worked across the open nose into the next draw and worked to a position somewhat above the gun. (He was later awarded a Silver Star for this act.)

I crawled up a sheltering wash to a position below the gun. I threw the one grenade I carried and Corp Collins threw some half-dozen with no effect. A belt of thick second growth with a tangle of vines screened the Japanese position and stopped the grenades short of their objective. Our skirmishers on the left, closing in behind, were met by rifle fire through the same tangled belt that was as effective as barbed wire.

I ordered the men to hold what they had and sent a runner to contact other patrols. Firing on both sides was spasmodic as we waited.

Lt Pew and Lt Simpson (Btry C) both arrived with parts of their patrols. Some two dozen rifle grenades were lobbed on to the point from the bluff. As dusk was approaching, we prepared to hold for the night and take further action the next dawn. A BAR group was sent down to strengthen the left flank but ran into a second machine gun moved over by the Japanese to cover that approach and were driven back. The Japanese opened with everything they had on Lapiay, and the mortar and howitzer fire started coming in on us from Langaskawayan. It was then that I started getting a good idea of the force we were up against in the area. As night fell, we pulled out and returned to Pucot.

In the meantime, Lt Holdredge, (CO of Btry C) that morning had taken out the patrol assigned Langaskawayan. His point surprised the main body of Japanese there. The point, consisting of a BAR man and rifle man, came on a clearing in which the Japanese were setting up a light field piece (probably the howitzer that fired on us.) They "hit the deck" and opened up on the figures scrambling for cover. Some dozen or so forms were dropped on the clearing when a BAR man turned to the other with "Come on. Let's get out of here, this ought to make them madder'n hell!"

In the withdrawal, rear guard action was necessary for some hundreds of yards. One member of the spread-out main body received a shot across his bow and, looking in the direction from whence it came saw a form in the bushes. He figured it was one of our men and, without sighting in, yelled, "You ———, quit firing at me." A Japanese jumped up and dashed away, "hell bent for election" as the man stood amazed!

Lt Holdredge and I got together, compared notes and made an estimate of the situation. We then reported to Cmdr Bridget the events of the day, and our conclusion. We figured the enemy in the area to number at least 200 and that it would take a fully organized battalion with supporting weapons to dislodge them.

During the night, a Marine 81mm mortar section under 1stLt M. E. Peschek arrived from the 4th Marines at Fort Mills. They set up in the saddle northwest of Pucot. Late morning, they began firing on Langaskawayan and Lapiay. I acted as spotter for their firing, manning the OP on Pucot. They responded with outstanding accuracy to the spots given, as the whole of Langaskawayan and Lapiay were worked over.

On one occasion, we were beginning to work a large area of trees when about 20 to 30 Japanese came pouring out, running to a smaller clump of trees. I gave a spot to come right 100 yards and fire for effect. We dropped a sea bag full into the trees and no Japanese were seen to leave. Previously, direct hits had beeen scored on the points where the Japanese were spotted the day before. There were no duds.

About mid-afternoon, our patrols moved into position and when the mortar fire was lifted moved onto the points. I returned to Lapiay and found that the area had been abandoned by the enemy. We returned to Pucot as ordered. Lt Holdredge was in command of several combined patrols that moved in on Langaskawayan. They were hit by a waiting enemy and badly cut up. Withdrawal with wounded was well covered and not pressed by the enemy. They returned to their assigned positions on the ridge. Lt Holdredge was among the wounded. During the evening Lt Perez (PA) moved in a 2.95mm mt. howitzer on the ridge near Pucot overlooking Langaskawayan.

Shortly after midnight on the 26th, Fort Mills opened fire with 12" mortars on Langaskawayan. A total of eight rounds were fired. Four of these rounds struck the shoreline of the point, the others were well wide. I was with Lt Fullmer on the OP at Pucot where he was spotting this fire and am of the opinion that the ineffectiveness of this fire was due to the lack of proper facilities for orientation of spotting.

On the 26th, from time to time, the Marine mortar section fired on Langaskawayan. Late after-

noon, I moved my combined patrol out to Lapiay, escorting a party to bury the remains of the four men killed in our action there. There was no evidence that the enemy had returned at any time during the past 24 hours. Back at Pucot, I received my orders for the following day—all forces were to join in the attack on Langaskawayan.

At dawn, the Marine mortar section, a battery of 75s and Lt Perez' howitzer all opened up on Langaskawayan. After spotting the 81s for a half-hour, I turned this function over to Lt Fullmer and departed from Pucot with my force (roughly two platoons). We detoured by Lapiay to check that point, then moved on around the bay to Langaskawayan. Our sector was to be the extreme right, to clear out the shoreline. When we were in position, I reported to Lt Bowers, USN, senior officer present. He directed me to have Lt Pew take over both of our platoons and to remain at the CP with himself.

When all units had reported ready, mortar fire was brought close to the point and then slowly shifted away. As this fire began to shift, the signal to advance was given. Immediately 75s began to pour into the area at random. (It was later explained that the battery had received orders of undetermined origin to neutralize the whole area in response to a general landing). It took a rather disconcerting quarter of an hour to get their fire under control again.

Reports soon indicated that the assault was progressing slowly, if at all. I obtained permission to make a personal check. Reaching the forward elements of the center, I found the situation lacking in organization. Sgts Morgan and Sawyer of my battery were near at hand. I put them in charge and told them to get things going, which they did in short order. The assault began to move but well behind the mortar barrage.

The enemy had remanned their positions and opened up with a heavy machine gun fire. When the machine gun opened up, it was my first impulse to hit the deck. However, glancing down to pick a spot I saw the dust all around jumping from the impacts. I was literally standing in the beaten zone, but not for long. From the point where I stood, we were receiving both frontal fire from the next knoll ahead and flanking fire from a large tree well to our left.

Sgt Morgan took several men forward to work on the front gun while I got a couple of Lewis guns dispatched to work on the flanker. The fire fight became quite intense as we were striving to gain fire superiority. The enemy not only got the better of us there but soon had us pinned to the ground. Morgan was cut off by the flanking fire and apparently lost. He and his men eventually all got out safely, having stayed low until things became quiet and then slipped back. I had the men fall back enough to gain cover behind the knoll and returned to the CP.

From the CP, we could see vaguely the progress of the left flank and the left center as these units continued to advance by very slow infiltration. They were crossing a wide bowl-shaped draw sparsely covered by small bushes. By mid-afternoon they were pretty well held up too. Snipers had slipped through to our rear and what few reserves we had were being employed to counteract them. A report was made to Cmdr Bridget that we could not hope to continue the attack or even hold our ground with the troops at our disposal. His orders were for us to "dig in and prepare to continue the attack tomorrow morning." (We, of course, did not know that this was to be carried out only as a last resort or that aid was being requested.)

The "naval battalion" was neither a battalion nor Marine as popularly believed. In the attack of this day, the 27th, a total of some 200 were involved, of whom only about 60 to 75 were marines. Units were hastily organized or semi-organized to meet the situation. What marines we had were mostly dispersed among the "bluejackets." It was a conglomerate outfit with plenty of spirit but lacking in both training and equipment and thrown in against odds. When Langaskawayan was finally taken (I was told later), among the papers found on the spot was a muster of the landing force including 294 men and seven officers.

The outlook seemed plenty black and, to make matters worse, the Japanese began a counter-attack. They got a straddle on the CP with their mortars but before they could fire a third round, the marines scored a direct hit on the Japanese mortar with the fire from their mortar. Under cover of heavy firing, snipers and light machine guns slipped through the weak point and the center and flowed up to cut us off from the rear. Our mortars went into action, halting the counter-attack but bringing only temporary relief at best. We requested permission to fall back to the ridge. Request granted.

The order was passed for the unit to fall back and reform defensively on the ridge line. In executing this order, several units had to fight their way through traps set up by the light machine gunners in our rear. The situation was temporarily out of hand and in disorder. However, when the ridge was reached, sufficient men returned directly to their stations to be organized quickly. As soon as the ridge line began to form, I took a runner and set out to report the situation at battalion CP (KM 179) and then returned to my own unit. On the way, a sniper had a clean shot at me at a distance of less than 50 yards. Characteristic of Japanese marksmanship, he scored a poor miss.

While on the trail to 179, we encountered the advance of the 2nd Bn 57th moving in. At 179, I was directed to remain temporarily and pass on all the information I had to several officers of the 57th who were there. I gave them several



Combat patrol assembles for last minute orders before wading into jungle.

maps and sketches of the area of Langaskawayan and located, as best I could, the strong points we had encountered.

In the meantime, the Scouts moved in to relieve the "naval" battalion. I was thoroughly impressed by the efficiency, discipline, and precision of their occupation of the area. They were every inch first-class fighting men going in to take over a situation they knew how to handle.

Later, Capt Wermuth arrived with his sniper outfit. His men were to relieve mine on Pucot so I guided them to the top and, when relief of outposts had been completed, brought my own men back out. We were ordered to go into reserve at Q Sta. My request to my battalion commander that I be allowed to observe the scouts in action was refused. During the remainder of the scrap, we were called out twice; once to meet a reported Japanese break-through that did not develop, and again to lend moral support to several scouts who were busy eliminating a half-dozen Japanese hiding in the rocks along the coast, north of Latain Point.

We resumed our training schedule and normal function of Q Sta. With Langaskawayan cleaned out, the scouts were relieved by a PA anti-tank battalion. The Navy furnished them air-cooled .50s for the points. We sent in a couple of squads to instruct them in the use of the gun and also to man the guns if necessary in case of emergency. Supply of men on the points was a real problem as both food and water had to be supplied from Q Sta. I appointed a mule-skinner and gave him the order to commandeer several native ponies. He returned that night with four stateside Army mules including three regulation pack saddles. He reported that it was all legal, but I did not ask any details. Our problem was solved.

On 16 February, all bluejackets were detached from the battery. (Lt Pew had been detached soon after we came out of the hills and sent south by submarine.) On the 17th, Sgt Bennett and his entire 3" gun crew were transferred to Battery C as replacements. That night the remainder of the battery embarked for the Rock.

On the Rock, Battery A was dissolved. Lt Van Ray remained in 3d Bn and took over our same bluejackets again to form the battalion reserve. Several machine gun crews were sent to the battalions for beach defense. I, with the remainder of the men (50), went to Regt HQ Co to become part of the regiment reserve.

Regt HQ Co was located in Government Ravine. We were assigned the uppermost part of the ravine for our bivouac area. This area was in time bombed until the ground was pulverized and hardly a stick was left standing. However, it was well masked from shell fire. We had only two men injured there.

Regiment reserve was to consist of personnel

from Regt Hq and Service Cos, Filipino naval reservists attached to messes, a PA AC unit and some few spare bluejackets. From this conglomeration, we formed two combat companies and designated them as Companies O and P. Major Schaeffer was reserve commander. Capt Chambers was CO of Co O, and I had Co P.

Our orders were to proceed to Malinta Tunnel in the event of an attack on the island and to stand by there, awaiting further orders. In the intervening time until the attack finally developed, there was very little to do except make reconnaissance trips about the island when conditions permitted and to sit and "sweat it out" when they didn't.

On 4 May beginning about 2100, the entire island was swept by intense shell fire. During this fire, Maj Schaeffer was warned that Diesel engines had been heard in the direction of Cabcaben. When it shifted from our area, we assembled out units in the vaults of the old mint and stood by awaiting developments. Nothing further happened so at about midnight we dismissed.

On 5 May at about 2200, an intense barrage was laid on the east end of the island. Lesser barrages were laid on B/S and elsewhere. Immediately after the lifting of the intense barrage, machine gun fire could be heard and tracers seen about the east end. I passed the word for my company to assemble at the vaults immediately. We were getting under way from the bivouac when a runner arrived from the major with corresponding orders.

Co P moved out from the vaults first. We took the South shore road to B/S, crossing B/S via the tank traps along the South shore. We had expected to have plenty of trouble getting through this area but instead the whole trip was made without incident. In Malinta, we settled down to await orders.

About 0100, Maj Schaeffer gave us our orders. Co P was to move out in the lead and, upon contacting the enemy, was to deploy to the left of the road; Co O was to follow and deploy to the right. The situation was vague. About 0200, I received orders to move out. Capts Lee, Clark, and Castle offered to guide me and we got under way.

A short distance outside the tunnel, we detected a couple of forms running along the skyline above us to the left. When we challenged, they "hit the deck." The three of us opened fire. A red rocket burst as we opened up, followed by a yell as a man was struck. A couple of marines dashed up the hill and came back with an English-speaking wounded man. I did not get to inspect the man closely.

We got going again and at RJ 42 turned left. Well out on this road, Capt Clark directed that we deploy and sweep out on toward the east. I deployed the 2d Platoon as it came up but neither the 3d nor the 1st were following. (The platoon leader, 3d, returned some time later with a few of his men to report "that some captain" had ordered him to take his platoon up around the water towers. There they had engaged the enemy.) As I was sending runners to look for the 1st and 3d Platoons, snipers began to fire on us from our front. I ordered the 2d Platoon to advance in order to take the high ground to our front. We did, eliminating a couple of snipers on the way.

I recognized a voice issuing commands on our left and hastened over to check with Lt Harris. He had his beach defense marines deployed clearing out a wood. He readily agreed to tie on to my left and extend to the beach. My 1st Platoon came up and was ordered to follow in support. We continued on over the spur and into the next draw.

We had just disposed of a couple more Japanese, who had attempted to play possum until we passed, when we ran into the Japanese line of resistance. It extended from the head of the draw at RJ 21 down the east slope of the draw. The machine gun was in a sand bag pillbox (one of our own) at the head of the draw and was firing down. Others were on down the draw giving locked bands of fire. The 1st Platoon went into action on its own along the line, leaving no reserve.

As O Company was nowhere to be seen, my first concern was my right flank. A squad was pulled back and distributed about the ruins west of RJ 21, giving us some measure of flank and rear protection. About this time another landing was made, part of which was along our shore. To my surprise, machine guns all along the north slope opened on the landing. One .50 was firing a steady stream of tracers from the next spur, only a short distance behind the Japanese line we were tangling with. The bullets smacking into the armor of the barges sounded like rivet hammers rattling away. PFC McKechine, seeing the boats coming in, took off to the left flank with a Lewis gun and a couple of carriers to a point overlooking the shore. He is reported to have done an outstanding job, personally accounting for two barges which were last seen drifting aimlessly without having touched the shore.

Two planes with running lights were circling and diving about the barges. Heavy explosions (later identified as mortars from Hughes) were occurring along shore and in the water. It appeared as if the planes were bombing. We believed without question then that we had air support. Actually, I am not convinced yet that we didn't.

In the meantime, we were suffering quite a few casualties in attempting to flank the Japanese line and take the gun at the head of the ravine. The enemy had rifles and automatic weapons covering every approach to this gun. We kept pressing all along our front, attempting to crack through at some point.

As there was a bright moon all through the predawn action, there was sufficient light to make out

terrain detail even at some distance. About dawn, Capt Chambers located me in the ruins near RJ 21 and told me that his company had been working on enemy positions around the water towers. They, too, had met stiff resistance and were too thinned out to continue without assistance. I was beginning to become worried in the same way. The 4th Bn (bluejackets with Army, Navy and Marine officers) arrived and solved that immediately. Two companies were sent to Capt Chambers' sector and two companies to mine. Capt Moore, USA, arrived with instructions from the 4th Bn commander, Maj Williams, to take over my sector. I remained with the captain as requested.

The fire fight became intense in the ravine at hand grenade range. One side or the other would, sooner or later, have to give way it seemed. But as the morning wore away, the Japanese appeared to be losing very little if any of their determination. We needed mortars to jar their machine guns loose.

Stiff fighting was going on around the water towers. It appeared that we were making progress there. Sometime between 1000 and 1100 (my watch went out of action leaving me in doubt about time from dawn on), we noticed the right flank beginning to fall back in disorder. I detected Maj Williams attempting to stop the withdrawal. He told me that tanks had been brought into action and that there were no anti-tank weapons available to stop them. By then it was too late to reorganize the line previously held. The major ordered a general retreat to the concrete trenches just east of Malinta Hill. I ran back to Capt Moore and, after informing him of the major's order, passed the word on down into the ravine. Men came streaming out, all dazed by the intense action but indicating resentment of the unexplained order to fall back.

Orderly action was impossible. The area was being swept by machine gun and artillery fire. We had to pass through two 240 barrages to reach the road-cut near the trenches. It was each man for himself. Casualties were heavy. Those of us who reached what had been the concrete trenches before the 240s worked them over, prepared to set up a defensive line. Maj Williams went to Malinta Tunnel to report the situation and obtain reinforcements.

Lt Harris joined me in the trench I occupied with a couple of dozen of available men. We began distributing the men for defense. The artillery fire had shifted to the east, leaving us in the clear. A runner came puffing up looking for an officer. He reported to us that the trenches had been ordered abandoned; that we were to fall back to Malinta. We passed the word along and then complied. In the tunnel, we reported to Col Beecher. He indicated ignorance of the order for our final withdrawal but told us that he had been informed that surrender was taking place. END

In Brief . . .

Private Louis K. Relyea, 23-year-old Texas Marine, has won the highest honor that can go to a recruit for marksmanship—the Brigadier General Calvin B. Matthews trophy and a congratulatory message from General A. A. Vandegrift, Commandant of the Marine Corps.

The trophy went to Relyea in recognition of his record score of 333 out of a possible CEJ *points record score of* CCC *out of a possible 350 points with an M-1 rifle. The highest since 1942 when the cup was first offered in competition, Relyea's score topped those of 57,000 recruits who shot for record during the 1945 target year. An engineering graduate, Relyea joined the Corps on Sept 12, 1945, and was assigned to San Diego for "boot" training.*

The Germans had developed techniques for detecting enemy men and machines in total darkness with invisible infra-red rays that were in some ways superior to radar.

As reported by American experts the Nazis successfully used searchlights of invisible light in two ways:

On tanks and other vehicles the Nazis once used night vision equipment to surprise and destroy 65 Russian tanks before being knocked out themselves. The invisible searchlights had a range of two miles.

On rifles of infantrymen, enabling a Nazi sniper to spot and shoot enemy soldiers "in complete darkness up to a distance of about 100 yards."

The infra-red searchlights sent out invisible rays, and the image of the target was reflected back and transformed into a visible image on a viewing apparatus.

Latest available figures show the following comparative percentages of men discharged from the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps since V-J day.

The Army had released 47 per cent of its V-J day strength as of 1 January, the Navy had discharged 51 per cent of its personnel as of 24 February, and the Marine Corps on 22 February had separated 53 percent.

Tentative peacetime Marine Corps plans include a Reserve of nearly 600,000 men; a "ready" reserve of 3,000 officers and 25,000 enlisted, and a "standby" reserve of 40,000 officers and 500,000 men. No policy has yet been announced on the future of the Women's Reserve.

Semper Fidelis

(*Continued from back cover*)

The wounded Marine, assisted by a Chinese boy who happened along, made his way back to the post and reported to his commanding officer. A party of marines, with an interpreter and an officer in charge, proceeded immediately to the village, where the word was formally delivered that the two bandits must be surrendered within 30 minutes; otherwise, the villagers should evacuate at once because the village would be shelled.

Shells Fell Short of Village

All this happened in a lawless area. The villagers took no action; 30 minutes passed, and neither were the bandits surrendered nor the villagers evacuated. The officer in charge thereupon ordered the mortar set up and fired, with the mortar sighted to land outside the village confines. The first shell was observed to fall a suitable distance short of the town; the same setting of sights was held through the remaining 23 rounds. By that time, nightfall was approaching and the officer knocked off firing and headed back to camp.

General A. A. Vandergrift, Marine Corps Commandant, has made this comment upon the incident: "Considering all the circumstances, it occurs to me that any other course of action short of that which was followed might have left something to be desired as regards the discharge of the officer's responsibilities. . . ." We agree with the General.

Now to get back to the editorialists who vowed, in the light of the first report of the accident, that the Marine Corps had shed its honor and failed in its duty to its country:

The trouble with such people, beyond their more obvious deficiencies, is that for every one of them who has a public voice, there are a thousand or ten thousand Americans who nod sagely upon hearing their diatribes and intone a reverent "Amen!" Thus the intellectual lassitude of one, when wired to a microphone or piped to a printing press, can sweep the country like a plague, infecting all others who think with their emotions instead of their heads.

Marine Record Ignored

It suited the purposes of the critics in this case to turn their backs on the Marine Corps' 170 years of unbroken, faithful service; it didn't matter that the same Marine Corps which helped found America survived to defend it with its blood at Tarawa and Palau, Guam and Saipan and Iwo Jima, Guadalcanal and Okinawa; it didn't matter that these same veterans of years of battle in the Pacific islands had accepted without complaint their assignment in China, when others by the millions were coming home to their families. Even the obvious fact that the Marine Corps is a mere instrument of national policy acting under orders which stem from the President of the United States fails to impress these critics. All they ask, these professional wailers, is the whisper of an excuse for viewing with alarm—and they're off to the carnival to shill their pamphlets to every yokel who'll pause to hear.

There is another earmark of this perpetually critical slice of the press, radio and public—the tendency to remold facts, by sly emphasis or bold distortion, to bolster the special prejudice of the moment. To such as these, an incident of this kind steps up the pulse rate; they can hardly wait to get into action. For instance, there are those who have a preconceived conviction that the Marine Corps should be abolished or swallowed up by the Army. They have a tendency to reach into any old bag of tricks for their proof. Therefore, they distort such incidents as the one under consideration here. And there are those who think that America itself is caught in an ideological rut and should be scrapped. These characters are always grateful for an opportunity to smear the Marine Corps.

The American people can, of course, throw out the Marine Corps—or the Navy or the Army—whenever they wish. But if they do, it should be on the established ground that the Corps has fallen down on the job and is no longer capable of fulfilling the duties assigned it. And it should not be on the basis of a series of specious, ill-considered utterances by those who, possessing only half the facts, elect to reshape them to suit their own prejudices.

People Owe Debt to the Corps

Until such time as the Marine Corps discredits itself—which it is not likely to do—the people should stand ready to challenge any aspersion upon the Corps and to demand at once that the critic produce all the facts. The people owe this to themselves as well as to the Corps. The esprit of the Corps is invisible to the eye, but there are men who saw it on a hundred beachheads in the Pacific who will tell you it is the palpable force that not only wins battles but insures the security of the Nation. The spirit of the Corps is armored against almost any kind of weapon, but it is not proof against ingratitude. The returning marine doesn't give a damn about riding through a blizzard of tickertape and torn phone books; the marine still at his post 6000 miles from his home shores doesn't have to hear his praises sung every Sunday to keep his spirits up.

But tell a marine he's failed his Corps and his country, and you tear the heart out of him. America is not yet so secure she can afford to let that happen.

The honor of the United States Marine Corps is one of this Nation's most priceless possessions. Every American should be ready to defend it at the drop of a hat—or a phony press statement. END

The Proper Wearing of Ribbons

Ribbons, battle stars, and marksmanship badges are marks of distinction. They should be worn properly regarding precedence, color, number and placement. ***By 2dLt G. C. Martin***

APPROXIMATELY a million and a quarter service medals were awarded to marines during the recent war. More than 17,000 decorations, not including the Purple Heart and the Presidential Unit Citation, have been pinned on chests throughout the Corps. Yet a short survey of personnel on one large post revealed that three out of five were wearing their ribbons improperly.

Such a lack of knowledge is due mainly to inaccessible information; the details on the wearing of ribbons are scattered through a long list of orders, directives, and publications. The purpose of this article is to consolidate all the pertinent facts on the subject.

Starting with the assumption that you know exactly what ribbons, stars, numerals, and letters you rate and have acquired a complete set, the problem is to assemble them properly and then to place them in the correct position on the uniform. The awards have definite rules of precedence, determined first of all by three classes: (1) decorations, (2) commemorative medals, and (3) service medals.

Within these classes, precedence is established as follows:

Decorations—1. Medal of Honor; 2. Medal of Honor (1917-18)—by law no longer authorized for award, 3. Marine Corps Brevet Medal, 4. Navy Cross, 5. Distinguished Service Medal, 6. Silver Star Medal, 7. Legion of Merit, 8. Distinguished Flying Cross, 9. Navy and Marine Corps Medal, 10. Bronze Star Medal, 11. Air Medal, 12. Commendation Ribbon, 13. Purple Heart Medal, 14. Presidential Unit Citation, 15. Navy Unit Commendation, 16. Gold Lifesaving Medal (awarded by Treasury Department), 17. Silver Lifesaving Medal.

Commemorative Medals.—1. Dewey Medal, 2. Sampson Medal (commemorating naval engagements in West Indies), 3. Byrd Antarctic Expedition Medal (1928-30), 4. Second Byrd Antarctic Expedition Medal (1933-35).

Service Medals.—1. Good Conduct Medal, 2. Civil War, 3. Expeditionary Medal (initial award—1874), 4. Spanish Campaign, 5. Philippine Campaign, 6. China Relief Expedition, 7. Cuban Pacification, 8. Nicaraguan Campaign (1912), 9. Mexican Service, 10. Haitian Campaign (1915), 11. Dominican Campaign, 12. Victory Medal, 13. Army of Occupation of Germany Medal (1918-23) 14. Haitian Campaign (1919-20), 15. Second Nicaraguan Campaign, 16. Yangtze Service, 17. China Service, 18. American Defense Service (pre-Pearl Harbor), 19. Area Campaign Medals (a. American Area, b. European-African-Middle Eastern Area, and c. Asiatic-Pacific Area), 20. Victory Medal—World War II, 21. Philippine Defense Medal, 22. Philippine Liberation Medal, 23. Organized Marine Corps Reserve Medal, 24. Marine Corps Reserve Ribbon.

The Good Conduct Medal was recently established as the senior among these service medals which are awarded according to the date of the campaign or service. The Expeditionary Medal is listed third due to its initial date. Your Expeditionary Medal has a chronological position based on the date of the expedition for which awarded. This principle also governs the position of the three Area Campaign Medals of this war, which are worn in the order earned. The Organized Marine Corps Reserve Medal and the newly authorized Marine Corps Reserve ribbon are the junior awards of all.

As for Army awards and foreign decorations, precedence is simple. Any Army award rates just below the corresponding Navy award (DSC after the Navy Cross, etc.). The Army Distinguished Unit Badge is worn on the right breast by Army personnel, but Navy personnel who have won it wear the badge on the left breast just after its equivalent, the Presidential Unit Citation ribbon. Foreign decorations are junior to all American awards and may not be worn unless at least one American ribbon is also worn.

In assembling the ribbons, the junior ribbon is on the bottom row and to the left or outboard when worn; precedence rises inboard and up along the rows (figure 2). Correct mounting also involves the seniority of colors and the number of ribbons worn. The ribbons are placed in parallel rows of three; if there are too many rows, four ribbons are placed in each row. The shorter row is always on top—and centered.

The seniority of colors, based on heraldry, is observed by always wearing blue, the senior color, up and inboard. Thus the blue stripe is on top of the Presidential Unit Citation ribbon, as it is on the burgee flown by ships winning the award. On each of the three Area Campaign ribbons, there are narrow red, white, and blue stripes in the center. The blue stripe is worn inboard, as is the case with the Navy and Marine Corps Medal ribbon and others having blue stripes (figure 1).

The final point to remember in arranging ribbons is that a new award means all your ribbons senior to the new one must be rearranged so that the new ribbon is in its proper position.

Many of the errors made in wearing ribbons involve the stars, numerals, and letters on some rib-



Figure 1: Blue ranks highest in seniority of colors and is always worn inboard.

bons. The stars should be placed on the ribbon point down (figure 3). Size should conform to these specifications:

Gold stars—5/16 of an inch in diameter—for additional awards of the same decoration.

Bronze stars—3/16 of an inch in diameter—for operations on area or expeditionary ribbons; for additional citations on the Unit Citation or Unit Commendation ribbons.

Silver stars—5/16 of an inch in diameter—for five gold stars or five bronze stars.

Bronze numeral, letter A, and *silver W*—3/16 of an inch in height—on the Good Conduct Medal, the American Defense Medal, and the Expeditionary Medal, respectively.

The stars, numerals, and letters are centered on



Figure 2: Precedence rises inboard and up along the rows as illustrated above.



Figure 3: Stars should conform to size specifications and be worn with point down.

the ribbon. Additional stars are symmetrically arranged in a horizontal line close to the center of the ribbon. No stars are authorized for the Victory Medal—World War II ribbon.

The position of the ribbons on the uniform varies with the type of uniform and if marksmanship badges are worn. Wearing the ribbons alone on a roll-collar coat (green or khaki), they are centered over the upper left pocket with the bottom row 1/8 of an inch above the pocket. Additional rows are 1/8 inch apart. Ribbons extending beyond the lapels are placed under the lapel (figure 4).

On a roll-collar coat, marksmanship badges are worn with their top edge one inch above the top of the pocket. The bottom row of ribbons is 1/8



Figure 4: Rows of ribbons, reach as high as the lapel, should be placed beneath it.



Figure 5: If marksmanship badges are worn, raise the bottom row 1/8-inch higher.

inch above the top of the badges (figure 5).

On a standing collar coat (blue or white), ribbons are worn on the left breast with the top of the row of ribbons midway between the first and second buttons at the top of the coat. Additional rows of ribbons are 1/4 inch apart. Officers' ribbons are centered over the left pocket; on enlisted dress blues, ribbons are placed midway between the center line and the left armhole seam (figure 6).

Marksmanship badges on a standing collar coat are centered 1/4 inch below the bottom row of ribbons (figure 6). On any uniform, Naval Aviation insignia is centered 1/4 inch above the top row of ribbons.

By conforming with the above rule, officers may insure the uniformity of their ribbons. By close observation at inspections, they can locate and correct any errors in the ribbons worn by their troops. END


UPPER EDGE OF TOP ROW MIDWAY BETWEEN 1ST & 2d BUTTONS.
1/4 INCH BETWEEN ROWS.
BADGE IS CENTERED 1/4 INCH BE-LOW BOTTOM RIBBON ROW.

Figure 6: On dress blues, ribbons rest midway between center line and arm seam.

What's Left of Rabaul

(Continued from page 7)

against Rabaul, although with a diminished monthly average of some 390 tons. In the last 13 month period, it was considered necessary only to maintain the neutralization of the base and, if possible, to sap its garrison's will to resist.

In the period November 1943-July 1944, Allied air power succeeded, first, in completely shattering the Japanese air power at Rabaul; second, in making Simpson Harbor untenable as a base for the Japs' 8th Fleet; third, in disrupting completely the system of supply of which Rabaul was the center and in virtually destroying its cargo fleet; and finally, in obliterating all surface installations at Rabaul and forcing the entire command to go underground.

The destruction of the Rabaul air force was completed with dispatch and authority. Of the 600 planes based on the Rabaul fields in November 1943, and the approximately 400 replacements flown in during the following three months, the Japanese admitted the loss, by mid-February 1944, of 727 aircraft. Despite vigorous Japanese interception—50 to 200 Japanese fighters often rising to meet attacking planes—the bombers and fighters of the 5th Army Air Force destroyed a total of 101 Japanese planes in the air and on the ground in November 1943.

In December, Navy and Marine landbased fighters flew 285 sorties against Rabaul, while 13th Air Force planes flew a total of 106 bomber sorties. All of the Rabaul fields were swept, the runways cratered and the air facilities damaged. An additional 64 planes were destroyed.

In an attempt to cut their losses, Japanese interceptors now adopted a radical change in tactics, abandoning formation interception in favor of individual tactics and employing such expedients as air-to-air bombing. A measure of the success that attended this change of policy is given by the loss in January of 133 Japanese navy planes and an undisclosed number of Army replacements. This was more than twice the previous month's losses.

The Allied score in February dropped to less than 100 planes but only because Japanese resources were practically exhausted. With extreme difficulty, construction crews had kept four of the five fields in operation, although they were all heavily cratered and most of the servicing facilities bombed out. But the aircraft complement was now pitifully small, and the Japanese were forced to admit that their position was unsupportable. On 19 February, the evacuation of the remaining planes to Truk got under way. By the end of the month, only 70 aircraft of all types were left in the entire Bismarcks area.

If the Allied victory over the Rabaul air force was definitive, the victory over the Rabaul naval and cargo fleets was equally so. The last operations in which the Rabaul-based fleet units participated were in opposition to the Allied landing at Bougainville. Although hit hard by the American carrier raids of 5 and 11 November, elements of this fleet left Rabaul and attempted disruption of Allied communication lines to Torokina. They were met by Allied task units and, in three engagements off Cape St. George and Empress Augusta Bay, suffered damage which forced them to retire. The heavy Allied bombing raids upon Simpson Harbor which had been in progress over three weeks, however, made return to Rabaul impracticable for the larger naval vessels. They elected, therefore, to withdraw to Truk.

Lighter Japanese units—destroyers and submarines—continues to use Rabaul as a base until the end of the year. In January, the preliminaries of Allied operations in the Central Pacific led the Japanese to order all naval units remaining at Rabaul to join the combined fleet at Truk. The last naval units to leave Rabaul were the minesweepers which departed in February 1944.

In the same period, the Rabaul cargo fleet was the object of unremitting attacks which in the end made the maintenance of any regular supply system impossible. Even before October 1943, 35 ships of 1,000 tons or above had been lost in the Bismarcks-Solomons area, while making supply runs from Rabaul to outlying garrisons. Indeed the success of Allied shipping strikes had been so great that Rabaul's supply function was, by October, restricted to the Bismarcks-Bougainville area only. The Allies began hitting at Simpson Harbor, the very heart of the system.

In the inclusive period October 1943-February 1944, at least 73 large cargo ships were sunk in Rabaul waters, while 70 ships of 150 to 1,000 tons were sunk in the same months. These losses were so great that the Japanese began to rely almost exclusively, after February 1944, upon small boats and barges and further restricted their routes out of Rabaul. All barge runs to Bougainville, for instance, were discontinued in February 1944, and the only traffic out of Rabaul was to points on New Britain, New Ireland and Duke of York Island. All Japanese attempts to maintain their system failed. Despite extensive camouflage and night movement, a total of 468 army boats and barges and 49 navy minor craft were lost from August 1943 until April 1944.

Concomittant with the destruction of Japanese surface shipping of all types, 60 per cent of Simpson Harbor and 40 per cent of Karavia Bay were so littered with hulks as to be unsuitable for anchorage. In addition, the greater portion of Rabaul's harbor facilities were either damaged or destroyed. It is doubtful whether this added greatly to the Japanese burden, for there was no longer any considerable traffic at Rabaul. Just as outgoing traffic had been interdicted, so was it impos-

sible, after February, 1944, for surface ships to reach Rabaul in safety. The last ship to reach the port was the *Kokai Maru* in February, and the last vessel of any kind to reach Rabaul was a cargo submarine which docked in April, 1944. Thereafter, the base was completely isolated by aerial and surface blockade.

Although aviation and shipping were the high priority targets for Allied strikes in this period, another important result of the air offensive was the complete destruction of Rabaul's surface installations. This destruction, begun in the early raids of 1943, was intensified in the last months of that year and completed by March, 1944. Among the important installations which were destroyed were virtually all of the facilities of Rabaul's five air fields, all of the barracks, six of the 11 radar sets, three power plants, one central radio station, five saw mills, two large army and navy general repair shops, fuel dumps containing 724,152 gallons of gasoline and fuel oil, and warehouses sheltering 60 per cent of the army's food stocks, 20 per cent of the navy medical supplies and 15 per cent of the army medicinals.

Guns were never a high priority target for Allied aircraft, and a relatively small number were destroyed. During the whole period of Allied bombing, the Japanese claim that only 93 anti-aircraft and one coastal defense gun were knocked out. It should be noted, however, that the incessant Allied strikes forced the Japanese to change their gun positions frequently, to employ elaborate camouflage and even to shelter their guns in the mouths of tunnels. These measures, while cutting losses, could not fail to restrict the effectiveness of the weapons and reduce their ability to defend important installations.

The cumulative effect of Allied bombing and the growing realization that their defense against Allied attacks was inadequate made the Japanese resolve, at the end of 1943, to move their entire Rabaul command underground. The accomplishment of this objective was not long delayed, for both terrain and bedrock were suited to extensive tunnelling operations. The bedrock, composed of unconsolidated fragments of volcanic ash, pumice and scoria, was soft enough to be picked by hand, while sufficiently cohesive to require little in the way of buttressing. Construction of caves and tunnels was able to proceed at a rate of one cubic yard per man day.

By March, 1944, Rabaul was honey-combed and the Japanese were able to move most of their important installations underground. They continued this activity until the end of the war, at which time there were approximately 350 miles of caves and tunnels in the Rabaul area. In these, the Japanese housed their personnel, administrative and operational offices, communications centers, hospital facilities, most of their supplies, and, in some cases, even trucks and boats.

As a passive defense against Allied air attacks, this expedient was entirely successful. Damage to Japanese installations at Rabaul was negligible after mid-1944. But the principal Allied objectives at Rabaul had been attained. Naval and aviation units had been driven from the New Britain base; the supply system had been hopelessly shattered; Rabaul had been cut off from contact with the homeland; and the Allies had now only to see that neutralization of the base was maintained.

When interrogated by Gen Merritt's party in November, 1945, the officers of the Japanese army and naval commands at Rabaul assumed an attitude which bordered on pride. They were quick to point out that, although there had been some 4,700 casualties during Allied raids, they were still 80,000 troops who had been kept in a high state of efficiency. They claimed that, although the incidence of malaria and tropical diseases had been great in the last year of the war, there had been no deaths from malnutrition, as at other Japanese bases, and no serious morale problem.

The defeated commanders pointed out that their antiaircraft and coastal defenses were virtually intact, there was ammunition and fuel on hand to supply a protracted campaign, the local transportation and communications systems were still functioning effectively, and the command had been ready at any time to oppose an Allied landing with confidence. They conveyed the impression that the Allied attacks on Rabaul had been ineffective, and they insisted that more than 1,500 Allied Aircraft had been shot down over the base.

The astronomical Japanese plane count is considerably higher than that of the total combat losses for the 5th and 13th Air Forces for the entire period of their South and Southwest Pacific operations. The other Japanese claims, while having some basis in fact, should certainly not be a source of pride to the Japanese. When one considers the original Japanese reasons for seizing Rabaul, the ambitious plans in which it figured and its great military potentialities in the early days of the Pacific war, it is clear that the Allied campaign against the New Britain base was an unqualified success.

By destroying or forcing the evacuation of all air and naval units at Rabaul, the Allies deprived the base of all offensive power and forced a defensive role upon it. By disrupting all supplies from Rabaul, they negated its primary function as a supply center for the Southwest Pacific area and gravely weakened the garrisons dependent upon it. By blockading Rabaul completely, they isolated a garrison of some 80,000 men and denied to the Japanese their use in any other theater. And finally, they had imposed upon the Rabaul command a mole-like existence, forcing it to expend excessive effort to protect its resources, although those resources—however well preserved—could no longer help the Japanese cause in any way. END


Military
Digest

In prelude to the Peleliu landing 8,000 pounds of tetrytol blast underwater obstacles.

Underwater Demolition

THEIR job was to blast the way for invasions. Their tools of war consisted only of a knife, as many high explosive charges as they could carry and small rubber boats. They worked under the very muzzles of enemy guns—without foxholes.

These were the Underwater Demolition Teams, made up of courageous and unpublicized men whose work uniform was a pair of swimming trunks. From the Mediterranean to Normandy to the Pacific, they successfully spearheaded D-day operations by removing thousands of mines, posts and a variety of other enemy-placed obstacles, designed to impede beachhead landings.

One of their biggest jobs in the Pacific was at Okinawa where they removed more than 3,000 separate obstructions. At Guam, they took out nearly a third of that number.

Demolition operations were always hazardous, but the job on Omaha beach in Normandy ranks as one of the most perilous. There three out of every five men became casualties. But in doing their job, the teams distinguished themselves.

Fortunately, casualties in the Pacific areas were much lighter. Everywhere the sacrifices and work of the demolition teams were a big factor in keeping down casualties among the assault forces which followed them to the beachheads.

Training for underwater demolition work began without publicity early in the summer of 1943. The Navy school at Fort Pierce, Fla., turned out some 2,500 officers and enlisted men.

The school had one of the most rigid physical training programs ever passed in the Navy. Principal physical requirements of the candidates, all volunteers, was that their ear drums be in good condition, so that they would be able to dive under water. Swimming had top priority in the training. In actual demolition work, the teams went ashore in boats as they placed their explosive charges in position to blow up enemy barriers. But a week or more before the invasions, reconnaissance teams were sent out—and they had to swim in from 1,000 yards or more off the beach and spend several hours in the water.

No matter how well a man could swim, he was drilled to use the side-stroke and breast-stroke instead of the crawl for purposes of stealth. On one reconnaissance training mission, a swimmer, caught in the current, stayed afloat without a life jacket for eight hours and it is claimed that this feat was excelled by others on actual operational missions.

To withstand prolonged immersion, the men got only the standard Navy diet with extra vitamin pills. Grease, favored by Channel swimmers, was found to be of no help. The men on reconnaissance missions wore ordinary swimming trunks, light tennis-type shoes usually fitted with a fin to aid in swimming, and sea-dive masks for working under water.

The underwater demolition teams training for the invasion of Honshu shifted bases from Hawaii

to Los Angeles because water off the latter site was more like the cooler water off the Jap mainland.

In the Mediterranean and Normandy invasions, demolition teams were composed of one officer and five men, many of them drawn from the Seabees, who are noted for their ability to improvise. For the Normandy operation, recruits were drawn from the Army, and the teams were joint Army-Navy units. In the Pacific, however, the personnel was exclusively Navy and the teams consisted of 13 officers and 87 enlisted men, usually divided into four platoons.

The Marshalls operations marked the debut of the underwater demolition teams in the Pacific. This was followed by operations in the Marianas, Carolines, Philippines, Volcanos (Iwo), and Ryukyus. In the European-Mediterranean theater it was Sicily, Normandy and southern France. After the initial operations, commanders of amphibious forces were fully aware of the value of these swimming warriors and acted to devise fire-control support that would keep every possible Jap back from the beaches and cut down casualties while the demolition crews were working.

Underwater demolition work had to be rapid and sure. Frequently on exposed reefs where a man was too clearly a target, the demolition crews had to work for short periods when tides partially or fully covered the reefs.

Normally they laid their high explosives around a large group of obstacles to be blown out. These were connected by cords of instantaneous explosive material. When the safety fuse was touched off, the whole area of obstacles went up together. Synchronized watches and radio contact were used among the platoons or groups of men to assure that the explosives were not touched off prematurely. On prearranged signal, all swimmers would hastily retire from the area of danger to their rubber boats, thence to landing craft to escape the deluge of flying coral, concrete, steel and broken timbers.

UDT members train on Hawaii's rocky shore.

Unsung heroes of the war, the men of the underwater demolition teams carried out jobs that were one of its mostly highly guarded secrets and they performed their missions without receiving extra pay such as is given to Army and Navy flyers, submarine crews and combat infantrymen for extraordinary and hazardous work.

When the Marines, who have been through some bitter battles themselves, landed on Guam they found the following notice:

"Welcome to Guam, U. S. Marines;* USO two blocks to right; UDT4 (Underwater Demolition Team Four)."

*(Marines were part of the UDTs in the Marshalls operations.—Editor's note.) ★

The Destroyer

by Capt Miles R. Browning, USN

DESTROYERS are often referred to as the "work horses of the fleet." The description is appropriate, for these swift and versatile ships are constantly being called upon for a wider variety of tasks than any other type of combatant vessel. Both during peace and in wartime, the unending demands for their services make them the most overworked units of the fleet by a wide margin. Not only are they at sea a greater proportion of the time than are the heavier vessels, but also, during every hour of every day of cruising, they are required to perform many special tasks which they, and they alone, are qualified to carry on. No important sea surface action took place in World War II without the presence of destroyers in the thick of the combat; a statement which can not be made of any other type of war vessel.

The destroyer is a comparative newcomer in the national stable of sea fighters. Unlike the battleship and the cruiser, the destroyer had no prototype in the days of sail. Her evolution dates from 1892 and the aircraft carrier is the only member of the fleet first-line family who is younger.

The destroyer was first designed and produced for the purpose of combating torpedo attack by small, fast, surface torpedo boats against large vessels. This latter menace commenced to take serious form in the last two decades of the 19th century when "torpedo boats" made their appearance in

If Germany Had Won

ONE of the German high command's most secret documents, "The Military Administration of England," recently fell into British hands. This 23-page document reveals that Hitler planned to complete the occupation of England before 9 September 1940, some 14 weeks after Dunkirk. Great Britain was to be transformed into Germany's main war workshop, turning out weapons for "The Battle of Russia," and to prevent sabotage Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, then commander-in-chief of all German forces, ordered that the entire male population of Britain between the ages of 17 and 45 should be deported to the continent and interned as soon as possible after the defeat.

This blueprint for Britain was mapped out a year before Hitler's legions invaded Russia, by the staff of German administration experts, working under the direct guidance of von Brauchitsch and General Halder, chief of staff of the German high command. Only 195 copies were printed and 78 of them were distributed among Nazi high authorities and Army officers, with the remainder reserved for the archives of the high command.

Some of the regulations outlined were:

1. Hostages to be taken as a security measure. 2. National laws in force prior to the occupation to be maintained only if not contrary to purposes of occupation. 3. The country's state of health to be considered important only as a safeguard for the resources of the country. 4. A non-fraternization policy for troops enforced on a limited scale. 5. Compulsory acceptance of German state banknotes, with a rate of exchange of 9.6 marks to the pound. 6. All public utilities, including gas, electricity, and railways, as well as objects of art, to be under the special protection of the Army. 7. Sabotage to include the concealment of harvest products. 8. Concealment of firearms, including shotguns, punishable by death by guillotine. 9. Curfew to be imposed from sunset to sunrise.

the world's fleets. HMS *Hornet* and *Havoc*, designated as "His Majesty's Torpedo-boat Destroyers," appeared as the first of their type.

Judging by today's standards, the destroyers were tiny vessels, of 250 tons displacement, 27 knots speed, and armed with one 3-inch gun and two 14-inch torpedo tubes. Such as they were, however, they were so much faster and more seaworthy than the torpedo boats which they were designed to counter that they not only fulfilled the hopes of their designers in that regard but also quickly usurped the latter's offensive functions of attack with torpedoes. Successive classes, which appeared at brief intervals in all navies, increased rapidly in size and armament; however, the concept of the type limited its employment to coastal waters and did not envisage it as a "deep sea" weapon. None of the earlier designs was capable of extended cruising or of operation in rough water.

As time went on, the "torpedo-boat" part of the unwieldy type name dropped off, but the "destroyer" designation was retained and the ships continued to increase in size and in gun and torpedo armament. In 1910, Britain commenced experimental development of a class of destroyers called "leaders." HMS *Swift*, launched in that year, was both the first of the new class and the largest destroyer built by any nation until some twenty years later. *Swift* was of over 2,200 tons displacement, 35 knots speed, and carried four 4-inch guns.

World War I quickly broadened the scope of destroyer operations. The German submarine fleet conducted undersea warfare on a scale never before imagined. The devising of some system of effective convoy protection against them became the most urgent need on the Anglo-French war agenda, for the U-boat, alone and unaided, was coming perilously close to treating the world to the amazing spectacle of successful blockade of the greatest sea power in existence.

The destroyer emerged from face-lifting operations as the anti-submarine weapon *par excellence*, and most certainly saved Britain from disaster at the hands of the German undersea forces. The U. S. "flush-deckers" of our 1917-1918 building program epitomized the destroyer as it appeared at the close of World War I. They were 1,200-ton ships, exceptionally seaworthy and fully capable of crossing the North Atlantic in any weather and under their own power, armed with four 4-inch guns, depth charges, and a powerful torpedo battery. They were equipped with sound detection gear, were capable of a speed of 34 knots, and were satisfactorily maneuverable. We built nearly 300 of these ships and many of them served with distinction in World War II, a quarter of a century later.

As World War II approached and finally broke, development of the type was frantically accelerated by all the naval powers. New destroyer designs carried dual-purpose main batteries, and every other fleet in the world looked with envious eyes at the U. S. ships already afloat, which had incorporated them from the outset.

One other major innovation appeared—the "escort" destroyer. This is a specialized class designed for the primary purpose of convoying shipping. The destroyer proper had grown in size, speed, gun power, and *expense* to a point where it was both wasteful to employ it exclusively on escort duty which did not permit full exploitation of its potential, and impossible to provide it in the needed numbers. Thus the war has brought destroyer evolution to the point where we now have two main classes of destroyer: the one, which we may call the "fleet" destroyer, a first-line weapon designed to go into action with and as a part of the battle fleet; the other, the "escort" destroyer, a smaller, slower, and less powerful edition designed for the screening and escort of shipping.

This fleet destroyer is a vessel of some 2,200 tons displacement, armed with six 5-inch dual-purpose guns and some 20 automatic antiaircraft weapons, ten torpedo tubes, carrying a heavy depth charge battery, and equipped with the most modern electronic, fire-control, communication, and sound-detection equipment. She is capable of extended sea cruising and her ability to fuel at sea from any type of vessel renders her able to accompany major forces for weeks and even months at a time. She can make some 38 knots.

The modern escort destroyer is a 1,400-ton ship, armed with two 5-inch dual-purpose guns and some 15 automatic antiaircraft weapons, three torpedo tubes, a powerful depth charge battery, and otherwise equipped in comparable manner to her big "fleet" sister. She is similarly capable of long-range, deep-sea cruising, but her top speed is only about 24 knots. She is at her best against submarines, but she can give an excellent account of herself under air attack. ★

"Mauler" Joins Navy

Graphically named the "Mauler," the Navy's newest and most powerful single-seater dive bomber torpedo plane will operate off the large aircraft carriers of the Midway class. The Navy's designation for this heavy, long-range plane is BTM. Speed in level flight of the BTM is over 350 miles per hour, maximum range over 1,700 miles. The BTM mounts four 20mm cannon, can carry 4,000 pounds of bombs or rockets or as a torpedo bomber carries one torpedo with additional rockets or bombs. (SEA)

Main St. around the Corner

by Lt James L. Frank, USAAF

NO matter how isolated his foxhole, no matter how primitive his surroundings, during most of the war GI Joe of the Army Air Forces had his "Main Street" just around the corner. For his health and morale, special equipment was designed that could be flown into battle areas so soon after a D day that not only were natives ogle-eyed but soldiers, conditioned to expect almost anything, did more than raise their eyebrows.

When the planes and gliders came down on landing strips, out rolled mobile tailor and shoe-repair shops, compact laundries, and an object to warm all Army hearts and cool all Army throats—a mobile ice cream plant.

Some of the latest equipment supplanted other mobile equipment which could roll close to the front lines but could not be fitted into airplanes or gliders. Toward the end of the war, when an airstrip was taken from the enemy, down came the tailor shop, and within two hours, buttons were being sewed on, tears and rips were being patched, and Uncle Sam's doughboys in the field were approximating what the well-dressed Army man will wear.

For the GI's footwear the army designed a shoe-repair shop known as the one-man cobbler, for the use of isolated air stations and airborne ground forces.

The most recently developed equipment underwent severe tests, and made its official debut at a conservation conference held at Seymour Johnson Field, N. C. There it met the approving eye of a half dozen Air and Quartermaster generals and members of their staffs.

Included in the clothing repair outfit are seven sewing machines and one darning machine, accompanied by the necessary number of soldiers who make needle and thread whir with a speed and skill that would do credit to New York's famed garment district. The equipment is mounted on a trailer and set up under a tent. A small electric generator supplies the "oomph." An hour and a half after their planes' wheels hit the ground, they are able to hang up their "Open for Business" sign.

The laundry, fueled by gasoline, kerosene or oil, is the result of study in the field and fills the needed niche between a 10-ton non-airborne mobile laundry and Mrs. John Doe's Monday morning nemesis with which GI Joe formerly struggled, but which he found inadequate for the rugged needs of a Pacific Island detachment.

Quartermaster Review ★



Radar Jamming

RADAR and the part it played in winning the war has been widely publicized but little has been said about the spectacular success of the Navy's program of radar countermeasures—RCM—to jam and make useless the enemy's electronic eyes.

Radar and related electronic devices completely changed the tactics of modern warfare by making it possible to "see" and attack an enemy hidden by smoke, fog or night. Radio impulses from a radar, however, are subject to interception, measurement, direction finding and interference. This is where RCM won out; it could neutralize use of radar to control gun and rocket fire, air raid warning, fighter direction, tracking and intercept and blind bombing.

Radar is like a man shouting and hearing his "echo" bounce back from a cliff. His "echo" is faint compared to the original power of his shout. Anyone standing on the cliff could, with considerable less lungpower, drown out his returning "echo." That is how radar countermeasures work.

Radar stations have to send out radio impulses of tremendous strength to insure a faint echo coming back. These stations can be heard at a much greater distance than the furthest range at which they can locate an object. Thus the radar itself can be detected easily, a fact which made radar countermeasures so successful against enemy search radar.

Radar has four weaknesses. *First,* its signals can be detected far beyond the range at which it can locate objects. *Second,* it betrays its location by the signal and by use of a radio direction finder, can be pinpointed and destroyed. *Third,* because the returning "echo" is so weak, a fairly weak "noise" will cover up the echo. The *fourth* weakness is that radar has difficulty in distinguishing between actual targets and free falling strips of

aluminum foil, called *window*.

Two main types of RCM were used during the war to blind enemy search radar or throw off the AA and searchlight control radars, or radio-controlled bombs—electronic jamming and use of aluminum foil called window or rope. Because each radar set operates on a particular frequency, it is necessary that the jammer—which is fundamentally a small radio transmitter—be turned to that same channel.

This necessitated carrying of jammers tunable over wide frequency ranges. On the enemy radar scope, jamming looks like many fine blades of grass moving about at random. Echoes from airplanes, which usually look like vertical spikes on the radar scope, become lost in the "grass" screen.

Before any counter-measures equipment can be developed, something must be known of the enemy's equipment against which it is to work. Jammers must operate closely to the frequency of enemy radars. *Window* is cut in various lengths according to the wave length to be jammed, common types running from 5/8" to 60". *Rope*, streamers of aluminum foil, is 400 feet long.

If a number of *window* packets are dropped out of a plane, a trail is produced in which a radar no longer can distinguish a real target. The plane's echo is lost among the *window* echoes. The Germans countered this by trying to develop a radar that would distinguish between a moving target and falling *window*. These anti-*window* devices, however, made their radar more vulnerable to electronic jammers.

Through use of jamming and *window*, Allied losses in bomber raids over Germany were cut as low as a quarter of those suffered before RCM was put in full use. Used in combination, they were more effective than either type alone to throw off German flak controlled by radar or to neutralize night-fighter plane radar. By V-E day, at least two radar jammers were carried in every heavy U. S. bomber and some 10,000,000 lbs. of *window* littered fields.

Naval vessels carried jammers, corner-reflectors, *window*-loaded rockets and shells to help them blank German coastline radar for the Normandy invasion. Navy patrol planes used direction finders to locate surfaced German U-boats using radar and sink them.

In the Pacific theater, the Japanese were far behind other warring nations in radar. The U. S. effort was directed toward obtaining frequencies, characteristics, locations and operational use of radar by the Japs. Early types of Jap radar ground sets were captured on Guadalcanal and Kiska and enabled us to work out countermeasures.

By the fall of 1943, the Japs had a rather extensive radar net in operation and the Navy equipped many planes to locate, photograph and bomb these installations. Geography of the war could have made radar a strong weapon for the Japs but it did not, because their development work was slow and because our RCM was so effective.

RCM-equipped planes flew over Jap-held islands, charted their radar defenses and weak points. This information helped attacking planes later by revealing radar blind spots from which they could sneak in on raids, as was done at Truk and other Jap island strongholds.

Jap use of radar by their own ships and planes was turned against them. Their signals were intercepted, the direction plotted and the attacks headed off by U. S. planes or ships. One submarine, the *Batfish*, sank three Jap subs this way. German U-boat commanders got so they refused to use their radars to find prey because their signals betrayed their locations before their search impulses found a target nearby.

When the Japs began to equip night torpedo planes with radar to find U. S. ships in the dark,



without jamming



with jamming

a new use for RCM was developed. A carrier task force made rapid modifications in its equipment and jammed incoming Jap planes' radar. The effect was startling. The Jap pilots lost their targets, orbited aimlessly and many were shot down by U. S. night fighters who vectored in.

Carrier planes supporting Okinawa operations used quantities of *window*. They worked out a scheme to cut plane losses by maintaining a 24-hour air patrol over Jap airfields when the Kamikaze went on the rampage. Teams of bombers and fighters orbited around these fields to hunt down suicide planes, using *window* or jamming on AA.

With carrier task forces, RCM played other important roles. It checked on unidentified contacts by examining the radar they carried, it coached long range air search radars on the target, and it often permitted through its use alone the splashing of bogeys before the enemy knew the task force was in the vicinity. It intercepted Jap search radar signals and gave early warning. It helped detect Kamikaze planes coming in for attack by finding radar-equipped guide planes which might be in the party. It threw off radar-controlled shore batteries and cut down beachhead losses at many landings ★

Tragic History

IN May 1945, the Army's 601st Graves Registration Company undertook its most difficult assignment when it began retracing the route of the infamous Bataan Death March to recover and identify the remains of Americans who died during that journey.

From Mariveles, a town at the southern tip of Bataan, Highway No. 3 stretches norward through the towns of Balanga, Orani, and Bacolor, and runs 120 miles north to the town of San Fernando, where the six-day march ended. All along this route lie the bodies of Americans, English, Dutch, and Filipinos, unclaimed and unidentified after nearly four years of war. With the capitulation of the Japanese on Bataan early this spring, the Army set to work to track down all information that might lead to identification and proper burial of the Bataan defenders.

Army officials decided that the task might be simplified if an actual participant of the Death March could be found—a man who knew the route, the names of some of the victims, and the places where men had fallen. The only person still in the Philippines at that time who participated in the march was M/Sgt Abie Abraham, released from Cabanatuan Prison by the 6th Rangers in January.

The problems to be surmounted were many. There were no official Army records of either the men on the march or the men who had died at the hands of the Japanese. Men of the 601st had no idea what three years of tropic rains and rapid growth of vegetation could do to hastily-made graves. Also, there remained the greatest problem of all—proper identification of bodies.

For lack of official information, Graves Registration officials turned to Filipino civilians for aid. The first platoon of the 601st, then under the command of Lt Manuel Nieves, contacted civilians in the town of Balanga, about halfway up from Mariveles, the starting-point. Public officials of the town were asked to announce to the townspeople that any information they might possess would be of great value. At Sunday services, priests asked their congregations for cooperation.

A public meeting was held in the square of Balanga, and Sgt Abraham was introduced as a survivor of the Death March. He told of seeing some of his comrades die when the weary, tortured marchers reached Balanga, and questioned the natives as to the disposition of the bodies.

At this point, Mario Bugay, a resident of the barrio, volunteered that he saw a burial take place near his home. Upon questioning, it was learned that the man had not died on the march itself but had been killed a few months later while on a work detail in Balanga.

Bugay was asked how the man buried there was killed. "He was very weak at that time," Bugay replied. "The Japanese called for him but he could not move, so the guard clubbed him to death. He was buried by his comrades."

Bugay went on to describe the man as being about 5 feet 11 inches tall, quite thin and pale. Another Filipino, Alfredo Pardillo, stated that he knew the name of the American soldier from an epitaph on the grave. Questioned as to how he could remember the name for such a long period of time, Pardillo answered, "I can remember the name, sir, because I have read it here during unforgettable times."

When the body was found and disinterred, evidence of a fracture on the left side of the skull was discovered, substantiating Bugay's story. It was also possible to make a tooth chart to establish identity by checking against War Department files.

Unfortunately, all such recoveries were not so

Battle of the Elephants

A HOTLY-CONTESTED battle for elephantine prizes went on for three years in Burma. Elephants are generally worth their weight in gold as workers, and the Burma variety are worth twice that in warfare, for they can do the work of a bulldozer and are much simpler to look after.

The Japanese captured most of the trained elephants with their mahouts (keepers and drivers) when they invaded Burma, and the British only managed to smuggle out 50 during their retreat. As their recovery was vital, a unit of British forestry officers was formed to recapture them. Commanded by Elephant Bill—Col James H. Williams—who had worked with Burmese elephants for 25 years, they operated far ahead of the front lines and fought for three years to win back the elephants to the fourteenth Army.

The Japanese made good use of their elephant booty, working them in the comparative safety of the jungle, far from their much-bombed road, rail, and river supply routes. Then, when they invaded Manipur, they used elephants to haul supplies across the Chindwin to their forward troops. During the British counter-offensive, more than 50 of the beasts were killed by RAF bombers.

With the failure of the Japanese attack came the disintegration of their elephant force. The Burmese mahouts began to desert and many of the elephants broke loose. After that, mahouts and elephants returned to the British lines in large numbers, so that the Fourteenth Army's elephant force was almost up to scratch again.—Military Review

easily accomplished. At the present time, very few bodies have been positively identified.

In all towns where meetings are held, Sgt. Abraham is introduced and does his best to search fading memories for information. Stenographic reports are kept of all interviews held. At first the Filipinos were reluctant to assemble, remembering the meetings held by the Japanese at which machine-guns and rifle-butts exercised persuasion. American understanding and kindness soon won their confidence, however, and the numbers of volunteers gradually increased.

As the weeks went by and clues began to take shape, it became apparent that, although many individual graves and common graves amounting to small cemeteries could be found, this was merely the beginning of the problem. Many more complicating factors arose. In some cases, after the passage of the Death March, entire towns were driven to the hills, and in the void that was left no one remained to care for the dead. Swollen streams and tropical rains had washed away the shallow, makeshift graves and in some instances scavenger animals had taken their toll.

Fearing detection by the Japanese, Filipinos sometimes carried bodies hundreds of yards from the road, burying them in swampy land or rice paddies. Conflicting stories arise. Witnesses to any event will always have slightly different versions, and in this case varying evidence on the location of graves must be taken into account and investigated.

The Filipino's natural love for trinkets became another barrier to success. From many talks with the natives along the route, it was evident that they had fallen into possession of many souvenirs such as bars, stripes, unit insignia, and identification tags. These "souvenirs," either given to them by American soldiers or taken from the bodies of the dead, were naturally final and absolute identification factors.

Some of these had long ago been lost by the Filipinos, and some had become such prized possessions that their owners were reluctant to part with them. Graves registration officials promised the natives they would not be deprived of their souvenirs—the Army merely wished to examine them for possible evidence.

As each grave is found, it is marked with a white cross, and detailed, scaled maps are made of the grave location. At one point near Bacolor, a few miles south of San Fernando, a white cross stands in a ditch by the roadway. A little farther south, about a hundred yards from the highway in a wet, marshy field, the graves of 20 unidentified dead are marked and staked off. The 601st has orders to disinter for proper burial only identified bodies, so while work toward this end continues, the dead lie in their initial resting places.

"Approaching San Fernando," comments Sgt Abraham, "casualties were naturally the heaviest. By this time, after nearly six days of marching, we were all about done for, and the Japs didn't hesitate to use their rifles and bayonets on stragglers. I was in good condition from my days as boxing coach of the 31st Division, so I managed to make it. Around San Fernando is where most of our work will have to be done."

The 601st Graves Registration Company, now under command of Lt Walter Maner, has been overseas for two years and has many campaigns to its credit. A well-seasoned group with very high morale, they have laid an excellent foundation for further investigation of the atrocious Death March. The search is still in progress, but the slow, painstaking process may last for many years.



Dangerous currents lurk within beautiful cloud masses. Can they be predicted?

Baiting a Thunderhead

WHAT goes on inside a thunderhead? How strong are the forces that grab an unwary pilot inside one of those towering beauties and toss his plane thousands of feet aloft?

The Navy, in cooperation with the Army Air Forces, the U. S. Weather Bureau and numerous civilian agencies, proposes to find out. To accomplish this, the Naval Thunderstorm Research Project has been set up, with headquarters at NAS Banana River, to make the scientific study this spring and summer.

All the latest scientific devices and techniques of the Navy and Army will be called into play to divulge the innermost secrets of those turbulent aerological cells. Planes have flown through thunderheads and come out in one piece, but they also have gone in and been torn to pieces by the up and down drafts that reach terrific velocity, estimated as high as 200 mph.

The researchers plan to use piloted planes, balloons and drones to gather data of what forces are at work in the cells. Special instruments which may be used include automatic pilots, air-speed-altimeter units, three-component accelerometers, movie cameras to photograph instrument panels, electric field recorders, span-wise pressure measurement equipment, water content and drop-size recorders, temperature and dew-point recorders, aircraft radar VHF sets and equipment to measure positions of and forces on control surfaces. Planes will fly simultaneously into thunderstorms at different altitudes to plot internal conditions. Present plans call for the Army Air Forces to fly B-29s and B-25s with crews from their Orlando base while the Navy from Banana River will dispatch F6F drones and F7F control planes from XVJ25. Aerological balloons will be released in large numbers in thunderstorm conditions. They will carry rawin targets, radiosondes to get thermodynamic details and radio-transmitting gear to measure turbulence, rate of climb and vertical air speed. All balloons will be tracked by radar, as will aircraft.

Radar also will be used to study water content and extent of thunderclouds. It is expected modifications and special attachments will be developed to adapt radar to the requirements of the project. Approximately 50 surface stations in a micro network will be located in the vicinity of the testing area to help gather data. These will be mobile,

self-recording station units including microbarographs, wind-vane anemometers, hydrothermographs and recording rain gages. These will measure temperatures, pressures, humidity, wind velocity and direction and rainfall in the test area.

Among the things the researchers hope to find data on are such things as the phases of the life cycle of thunderstorm cells, what parts of them, if any are safe for flying, engineering stresses on surfaces, and the micro structure of thunderstorms. Data are expected to improve aircraft operational techniques in and around these phenomena.

Other agencies which will participate with the Navy and Army in the studies include the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, University of Chicago, Naval Research Laboratory, University of Mexico, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Soaring Society of America. They will look after such things as developing instruments to measure gusts and vertical motion of aircraft, special balloon-borne equipment, aircraft electrical field recorders, thunderstorm electricity research, radar cloud studies and measuring water content and drop size of clouds. The Soaring Society has indicated its interest in sending gliders up to participate in the scientific studies.

The usual thunderstorm cloud is crowned by a flat spreading top, known as the *anvil*. Inside, a violent boiling motion takes place, with updrafts and downdrafts sometimes close together. Greatest activity usually is in the lower two-thirds of the thunderstorm area. The average height of the storm in temperate latitudes is 15,000 to 20,000 feet, while in tropics they may go as high as 60,000 feet. Large planes have been flipped over on their backs and forced aloft at a rate of 1,000 feet a minute. Inside, hailstones of huge size may damage the plane. Lightning found around them usually will not damage an all-metal, closed cockpit plan, judging from past reports. ★

Occupation Bill Argued

A bill to authorize the increase of Marine Corps strength to 700,000 for occupation duties which was introduced to Congress on Feb. 1 by Representative Koppelmann of Connecticut has been criticized by Representative Carl Vinson, chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, who sees the Marine Corps as a highly trained amphibious force, mobile and ready for instant action. "Any further diversion of Marines to occupation duties would seriously interfere with that training program," Mr. Vinson contends. According to the New York Times, *Representative Vinson will introduce a bill to establish a special occupation force within the structure of the Army.*

Propose Marines as World Police

FURTHER delay in the enactment of legislation establishing the postwar strength of the Navy and Marine Corps was indicated recently despite pleas that Congress hasten final action on this vital legislation which has been pending several months.

Identical bills (H.R. 5331-S 1784) to increase the active enlisted strength of the Marines to 700,000 for the purpose of taking over all occupation duties, have been introduced by Representative Herman Kopplemann (D., Conn.) and Senator Brien McMahon (D., Conn.), and referred to the Naval Affairs Committee.

This massive peacetime corps—200,000 stronger than the peak wartime strength—would be committed to the United Nations Organization to serve as a world police force. Base pay of enlisted men and officers would be increased 50 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively, for overseas duty "to increase the dignity of men who choose the military as a career," a spokesman said.

Coupled with a bill (H.R. 4421) which already has passed the House, setting the strength of the postwar Navy at 540,000 and the Marines at 108,000, the Senate Naval Affairs Committee now finds itself with two separate bills dealing with postwar strength of the armed forces.

Neither will receive immediate consideration, however, due to other prolonged hearings. They will be scheduled, however, as soon as advisable and certain high officials called upon to testify.

Copies of the bills introduced by McMahon and Kopplemann have been sent to the Navy Department for comment, but no official reaction was divulged. Nor would BrigGen G. C. Thomas, Marine Corps Plans and Policies director, comment. A recent sampling of enlisted regular marines by the *Army and Navy Bulletin* disclosed, however, that most Leatherneck regulars are in favor of taking over the job of occupying Germany and Japan.

In order to clear the way for any increase in the size of the Marine Corps, the Act of April 22, 1941, which says that the Marine Corps shall be one-fifth the size of the Navy, would be amended.

Marine Commandant, Gen A. A. Vandegrift, recently announced plans for a Marine Reserve of nearly 575,000, but gave no indication of plans for a larger active corps than the 108,000 requested in September.—*Army and Navy Bulletin.* ★

Yankee Hell Jelly

by Lt Ira S. Glick, USAAF

SCIENCE'S atomic bomb, with its ravening sunburst of sheer energy, certainly turned out to be war's No. 1 weapon—proving itself in the home stretch. However mankind, with characteristic penchant for self-destruction, developed war weapons in logical sequence. For if the atomic bomb is the ultimate in sheer terror, then Napalm is an older member of that same family.

To one, who has never seen a fighter come screaming in at deck level, feeling for the ground with dipping wingtips, dropping a wing tank which disgorges ugly fire for hundreds of yards, this may seem a far-fetched relationship. But when you see men, covered with licking flame, run and roll on the ground in pain and terror—the lineal ancestry, if only in mental conception, is more apparent.

News releases of Napalm in war have been kept to a minimum. The world cheered when, some weeks after D-Day, the Mad Colonel of St. Lo surrendered. Not released was information about the fighter-bombers that dropped two jelly-bombs in his court yard, and circled, waiting for a white flag. No white flag, and 30 more jobs would have turned the area into a heaving sea of liquid fire. Showing at least curiosity, if not good sense, the Colonel came out with his hands high and said, "Vat vas dot stuff?"

Too bad some mid-western short-order cook with a sense of humor couldn't have been there to say, "Hot stuff, doc, hot stuff!" The story of hot stuff is one of those fantastic yarns, half compounded of luck and half of Yankee ingenuity.

Birth of this baby can perhaps be traced back to days of early '42 in the China-British-India theatre when fighter pilots dropped their wing-hung gas tanks and then strafed them to start a fierce, momentary blaze. Surprising, but limited, success of this technique resulted in a request to the Air Forces Proving Ground Command at Elgin Field, Fla., for the test of technique and development of igniters to start a fire on impact. An igniter was developed, but the project was not recommended as a combat technique, due to the momentary duration of fire. And that was the last mention of air-borne fire-bombs for two years.

In the first days of 1944, the project was again undertaken—this time for the purpose of finding a use for thousands of 55-gallon drums left behind by the enemy in China, Burma, and India. A mixture of gas and crude oil was to be tried. Then luck took over. As the test program neared completion, someone thought of trying Napalm.

Unmixed Napalm is a brownish sort of soap flaky material, innocent to the glance. When mixed with gasoline it has the look of orange gelatine, and the soul of hell.

Jellied Napalm proved a vicious success after the improvisation of igniters and tailfins for the 55-gallon drums.

Problems now turned up like worms after a rain. A new igniter had to be developed. Napalm and gasoline couldn't be mixed directly in the belly tanks but had to be mixed and transferred from the 55-gallon drums, so Yankee ingenuity was forced to devise a method of transfer—and the odd mixture of nuts, bolts and old spare parts which ultimately made up the first mixing and transfer unit is now standard Air Force equipment, neatly labeled and assigned an orderly stock number. One of these units now weighs 350 pounds and can supply 24 fighter-borne 165-gallon tanks daily.

The 5th Air Force adopted the new brat eagerly, and winging in low over Leyte, blasted the last remaining Jap strong points into seething, smoking rubble. The teletype in 5th Air Force headquarters chattered gaily after this strike. The ribbon read, "Strike results were unbelievable. Observers report half of two houses standing in whole town. There is no more town where this used to be. Can we get more of it?"

The period between January of '45 and the peace was studded with hundreds of Napalm strikes which rocked the Jap and made him pray in his own odd fashion that when he was finally snatched from this vale of tears and transported to the Elysian heights—it wouldn't be via that Yankee hell-jelly, Napalm.

A-Bomb Can't Fix Weather

DR. F. W. REICHELDERFER said recently that you can stop expecting the atomic bomb to do anything about the weather—it's too puny. Reichelderfer is chief of the United States Weather Bureau and knows a great many facts about weather.

Don't get Reichelderfer wrong—he is not pooh-poohing the atomic bomb. It's a tremendous thing.

But great as it is, "it is still puny when compared with the titanic forces of nature—forces so great that they defy all calculation."

All weather manifestations, Reichelderfer said, result from atmospheric conditions over "areas so vast that an atomic bomb could hardly have more than a local and a very temporary effect on the weather.—*Washington Post.* ★

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

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

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Semper Fidelis

Works Both Ways

A reprint of the San Francisco *Chronicle's* editorial defense of the Marine shelling of a Chinese village

THE United States Marine Corps, after 170 years of valiant service to its country, was startled and understandably distressed recently to find itself under savage attack on the ground that it had grossly violated the very essence of the Corps motto—that it had been faithless to its trust.

On the basis of a report that a Marine detachment in China had pumped two dozen mortar shells into small village as the aftermath of the murder of a marine, some elements of the press, bustling with prim indignation, screamed that the Marines in China had turned out to be a bunch of butchers. Clucking with ruffled righteousness, they even wanted to know where the United States got off, condemning General Yamashita, "Tiger of Malaya," to hang while it nursed the Marine Corps to its bosom.

There was no disposition to wait and see what additional facts might turn up. It was clear, to these editorial sad sacks, that the Marine Corps was no longer to be trusted, and they said as much to their public.

The incident, itself, when the facts were finally unearthed, was hardly worth repeating in the first place. But the face put upon it, whether through inept reporting, the half-cocked judgment of editors, or deliberate fraudulent intent, was another matter entirely. Because of this, it becomes necessary to review the facts of the incident itself before passing on to its significance.

First word of the affair came in press dispatches from Tientsin, China, dated December 8. They reported that American Marines had fired 24 mortar shells into a small village on December 4, after two Chinese gunmen killed one marine and wounded another "in cold blood." The village had sheltered the gunmen, and the Marine officer gave the order to fire after villagers had ignored an ultimatum to surrender the bandits within 30 minutes. A naval board of inquiry had been appointed to investigate the incident. One dispatch quoted "combat men" as estimating that the village could have been wiped out if all the 60mm mortar shells had scored direct hits That was the story. It had hardly been torn from the teletype printers in the United States before some newspapers started their editorial gum-beating "Butchers" . . . "Semper Fidelis Indeed" . . . "the American Lidice!" . . . and rot like that.

The naval board of inquiry meanwhile set to work. It established the rather significant facts (verified by subsequent news stories from the scene) that: (a) the mortar shells had fallen, by deliberate calculation on the part of the Marines, *outside* the village, and that consequently, (b) there were no *casualties*, major or minor, while property damage was limited to two broken window panes.

The real story, which placed a somewhat different cast upon the affair from that inferred by the critical element of the American press, was essentially this:

Two marines, off duty, went rabbit hunting. They met three Chinese not recognized by them as bandits, who fell in behind them on the trail. The innocent-looking Chinese suddenly opened fire with an automatic pistol, killing one marine and wounding the other, who fell to the ground feigning death. The thugs fired another shot into each body, stole their carbines, ammunition and personal effects, left them both for dead, and set off toward the village, 400 yards away.

(*Continued on page* 34)